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FORWARD
Have we lost our way?
 
By “we” I mean the people of Metro Vancouver.   
By “our way” I mean the guiding vision we have used 
to shape this place, our urban region - built, natural 
and spiritual.   
We do have an articulated vision, insofar as it is 
captured in our plans, policies and rhetoric. It is, 
fortunately, a vision that has remarkable resilience, 
mainly because of its resonance with public 
values and the consensus support it has enjoyed 
from all local councils which comprise the metro 
federation.  It has sustained us for half a century, 
across the region, across the ideological spectrum 
and for the most part across levels of government. 
That vision, captured in a simple, elegant phrase, 
is “Cities in a Sea of Green.” 
Rather than divert into explanation, I’ll simply say 
this: If there is a reason for our success as an urban 
region in the world today, it is because we took that 
vision seriously and stuck to it. 
Most often we take it for granted.  Which could 
potentially lead to neglect.  And out of neglect, we 
risk undermining our achievements without a 
consensus or even articulation of alternatives.  The 
transportation referendum and simultaneous 
approval of a ten-lane Massey Bridge was not a 
good sign; the very imposition by the Province 
of a referendum on adequate funding for public 
transportation without any regional examination of 
the impacts of highway expansion is evidence of the 
disconnect between vision-making and decision-
making.  
But the most egregious form of neglect is, I believe, 
failing to tell our own story, and failing to pass it on 
to the next generation.  There’s a void here where we 
have an opportunity to create understanding.
Why not, I thought, create an incentive to tell our 
story, and involve young people in doing so? 
As someone involved in regional governance as 
an elected official, and then as director of the SFU 
City Program, I saw young people all around me, 
trying to understand this region and how to become 
effective leaders within it.  Why not ask them for a 
study of this region?  Why not commission a paper 
and promote the results? Let’s see how they would 
tell our story and identify the issues that must be 
addressed.
I funded a prize of $5,000 and offered it to students 
in SFU’s Urban Studies and Public Policy units for a 
review of the impact and challenges of “Cities in a 
Sea of Green.”  A small committee helped adjudicate 
and choose the finalists.   Now you can read for 
yourself the impressive results: “Cities in a Sea of 
Uncertainty:”
My thanks, especially, to Meg Holden, who helped 
both steer the process and advise the students.  And 
to Ken Cameron and Chris DeMarco, who helped 
choose the winners and contributed their comments 
on their paper in an “Afterword.”
Most of all, my congratulations and thanks to Katelyn 
McDougall, Linda Mussell and Sherry Yang - the next 
generation who will help make sure we don’t lose our 
way.
Gord Price
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ALC    Agricultural Land Commission
ALR    Agricultural Land Reserve
CMHC   Canadian Mortgage and    
   Housing Commission
CSCD    Ministry of Community, Sports   
   and Cultural Development
EAO  BC Environmental Assessment   
   Office
FOI    Freedom of Information
GVRD    Greater Vancouver Regional    
   District (Metro Vancouver)
GMTR  George Massey Tunnel    
   Replacement Project
ILMB   Integrated Land Management   
   Bureau
LMRPB   Lower Mainland Regional    
   Planning Board
LRSP    Livable Region Strategic Plan
MOTI  Ministry of Transportation and   
   Infrastructure 
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stakeholders (e.g., province, municipalities, advocacy 
groups), as well as political struggles resulting from 
lack of cooperative communication and decision-
making.  
Section 5 (Systemic Challenges in Regional 
Governance and Planning) discusses cooperative 
governance system characterizing the local-regional 
working relationship, as well as the local/regional-
provincial land use disagreements.  In particular, 
this report argues that the unilateral provincial 
directions, lack of meaningful engagement and the 
prevailing difference in planning belief systems do 
not contribute to productive intergovernmental 
collaboration and significantly weaken the regional 
players’ ability to advance the Cities in a Sea of Green 
Vision.  
Section 6 (Pragmatic Policy Options) breaks 
down high level alternatives for structural changes 
to the current state. These recommendations are 
made with the criteria of maintaining and restoring 
the integrity and objectives of the region’s plans, 
maintaining the region’s long-held values of 
sustainable development.
complete economic strategy and struggles to address 
housing affordability and automobile dependence. 
Concerning land use planning, a lack of emphasis 
on implementation continues to impair regional 
planning successes.
Section 3 (The Region: Uncertain Outlook) 
focuses on issues of local and provincial development 
interests countering regional aspirations as per 
the Vision and explores two case examples of 
amendments to the Regional Growth Strategy (‘RGS’) 
to accommodate development.  Using examples 
of the Delta Southlands and Langley Township 
University District, the report summarizes how 
the regional government struggles to maintain 
the RGS principles despite overt challenges to the 
fundamental goals in the regional plans.  Closely 
related to this issue is the current state of the 
Agricultural Land Reserve (ALR), an important force in 
the conservation of green spaces in the province that 
is challenged by emerging development interests.  
Also important is the continuous prioritization 
of auto-dependent projects that sap the region’s 
commitment to public transit, best epitomized by 
the Gateway vision, and the provincial government’s 
intervention in TransLink’s governance and funding 
arrangements. 
Section 4 (Case Study: George Massey 
Tunnel Replacement Project) provides the central 
case study of this report that captures many of the 
systematic challenges facing the region’s land use 
objectives, governance and its working relationship 
with the BC government.  This section summarizes 
the rationale of the project, support and opposition 
to the project, economic drivers, and the role of Port 
of Vancouver (formerly Port Metro Vancouver) (‘the 
Port’) and Metro Vancouver municipalities. Overall, 
this example evidences key themes of a persisting 
Vision with different outcomes on key players and 
1. Land use and transportation policy decisions 
implemented do not necessarily reflect the 
Vision, 
2. Collaboration between local, regional and 
provincial actors is strained as there are 
political barriers to making decisions which 
support the Vision. 
3. Political actors are guided by divergent 
interests and divided by power and status 
differentials, making finding common ground 
difficult; and
4. The BC government’s prioritization of the 
Gateway vision, combined with its reluctance 
to engage in transparent, meaningful and 
consensus-based debate with regional 
counterparts, has ultimately put the Vision 
and its implementation at risk. 
Section 1 (Background) describes the 
historical roots of the guiding policy underpinning 
this report. It discusses how the region has a 
long history of progressive planning, popular 
participation and activism in order to influence 
policy outcomes. This section summarizes the 
evolution of regional governance and planning, as 
well as the establishment of Metro Vancouver as 
a regional government. TransLink is introduced as 
the transportation arm of the regional entity, which 
also has had a contentious relationship with the 
province. Essentially, the history of the region is one 
of a struggle of interests, power, and resources – a 
dynamic evidenced in the present day.
Section 2 (How are We Doing) assesses 
Metro Vancouver’s performance in implementation 
of land use planning goals as well as the provincial 
government’s performance in land use planning. 
Metro Vancouver is found to perform well in many 
priorities of its regional plan, yet has not developed a 
SUMMARY
Metro Vancouver is growing rapidly. Urban 
development patterns may no longer align with the 
regional vision that has helped shape the area’s 
land use over the last 50 years. This study explores 
some recent land use and transportation decisions 
in Metro Vancouver, as well as the political dynamics 
and decision-making processes that have influenced 
the region.  A series of case studies are examined, 
including debates around the highly contentious 
George Massey Tunnel Replacement Project (GMTR).  
Specifically, this report aims to summarize 
the current state of the region in the context of 
land use and transportation planning decisions and 
the intergovernmental collaboration and processes 
underpinning these decisions.  The report examines 
the success and legacy of the “Cities in a Sea of Green 
Vision” (the Vision) (LMRPB, 1963) and pathways 
forward. That central Vision can be clarified as land 
use planning goals made to produce and maintain “a 
series of cities in a sea of green … a valley of separate 
cities surrounded by productive countryside” 
(LMRPB, 1963, 6). While this concept guided the 
development of the region over the last few decades 
and is operationalized with the Livable Region 
Strategic Plan (LRSP) (1996) and Metro 2040: Shaping 
our Future (2011), it may be losing momentum 
in practice in light of growth challenges and 
intergovernmental tension.  This report elaborates on 
some of these challenges, elucidates the deficiencies 
in the working relationship between the Government 
of BC and regional entities in our province, all of 
which threaten the preservation and implementation 
of the Vision.  It is important to take stock of 
where we are as a region, the dynamics of how we 
got here and how we can better meet the Vision 
going forward and achieve compact development, 
agricultural land and green space preservation and 
transportation alternatives.  The overarching themes 
highlighted by the report are the following:
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protection.  However, recent policy problems have 
been fraught with controversy. Specific examples 
include the George Massey Tunnel Replacement 
Project (GMTR) along with other instances of 
automobile-centric planning, the loss of Agricultural 
Land Reserve (ALR) parcels to urban development 
interests and the governance structure and funding 
of TransLink.  
To support this research1, literature reviews, 
media scans, and semi-structured interviews were 
completed. Interviews were conducted with 10 
experts in municipal, regional and provincial policy, 
planning and politics, and representatives of non-
governmental groups. Research findings largely 
indicate some overarching trends.  First, there is a 
strong indication that numerous recent land use 
and transportation policy decisions do not reflect 
the Vision.  Second, collaboration between local, 
regional and provincial actors on regional land 
use planning is strained by conflicting political and 
planning ideologies and power differences.  Related 
to this point is that the longstanding cooperative 
governance and decision-making structure of Metro 
Vancouver is undermined by not only growing 
pressures but also a reluctance to adhere to long-
term sustainable land use policy.  Finally, these 
problematic trends are further exacerbated by a 
general reluctance on the part of the provincial 
leaders to engage in a meaningful and consultative 
dialogue with the regional entities, let alone 
recognizing the core values with which Metro 
Vancouver has long identified. We hope this report 
will be used to inform discussion pertaining to 
improving planning processes and governance 
structures to promote outcomes in alignment with 
the Vision.
1  Approved Ethics Application 2016s0315, 
Simon Fraser University
INTRODUCTION
Metro Vancouver is experiencing many 
environmental, economic and social changes which 
include population growth, economic transformation, 
and influx of foreign capital. The current regional 
governance system is being put to the test.   On many 
occasions, land use and transportation decisions 
in Metro Vancouver appear not to align with the 
regional vision that has helped shape growth and 
development over the last 50 years.  Although these 
decisions have not posed an immediate threat to the 
overall quality of life and livability, there is a need for 
cautious stewardship of land and resources to ensure 
long-term environmental, social and economic 
sustainability. This report seeks to contribute to an 
ongoing region-wide discussion: Where does the 
region of Metro Vancouver stand now compared to 
its regional goals?  How do we describe the dynamics 
of change in the region? And what are the key drivers 
of the recent conflicts over land use decisions? 
To address these complex questions, this 
report revisits the Vision which has served as the 
central philosophy guiding regional growth since 
the early 1960s, known as “Cities in a Sea of Green” 
(LMRPB, 1963). Specifically, this report examines the 
success and follow-through of the Cities in a Sea of 
Green Vision (the Vision). The Vision can be clarified 
as land use planning to produce and maintain “a 
series of cities in a sea of green … a valley of separate 
cities surrounded by productive countryside” 
(LMRPB, 1963, 6). 
In particular, the report elucidates the 
working relationship between the Government 
of BC and regional entities. This relationship can 
be characterised as dynamic, with periods of 
collaboration and progressive policy and those 
of discord. Past examples of success include the 
discretionary planning processes in the 1990s, when 
participative, responsive, and design-led approaches 
were taken to urban regeneration and green space 
1. BACKGROUND
 
 The period following the Second World War 
placed unprecedented demands on Canada’s urban 
regions as a result of rapid population growth, the 
widespread adoption of the automobile and strong 
economic development. The response in provinces 
such as Ontario and Manitoba was to create new 
systems of metropolitan government for major 
regions such as Greater Toronto and Winnipeg. 
British Columbia opted for an approach that built 
upon the existing municipal government structure 
by encouraging planning and collaboration among 
municipalities, first through agencies such as the 
Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board (1949) and 
later through the creation of regional districts (1965).
As once described by Municipal Affairs 
Minister Dan Campbell, regional districts were not to 
be “conceived as a fourth level of government, but 
as functional rather than a political amalgamation” 
(Smith, 2006, 156). As explored throughout 
this paper, for Metro Vancouver, the ongoing 
intergovernmental challenges have impacted the 
region’s ability to actualize various services, planning 
aspirations and land use plans. The region’s ability – 
or inability – to execute plans has historically been 
impacted by other levels of government, major 
regional stakeholders such as Port of Vancouver 
(formerly Port Metro Vancouver) and by public 
discourse and unanticipated events. It is also possible 
that the notion of a regional “functional authority” 
– as compared to a political amalgamation - has 
undermined the region’s ability to progress towards 
actualizing land use planning goals (Friesen, 2014, 
42). Contextualizing some of these tensions and 
influences will help frame the research analysis. 
Firstly, underlying tensions have always 
existed between the local and regional levels of 
government. In Metro Vancouver, the regional 
governing board is made up of elected municipal 
officials who have been appointed to the board by 
their municipal councils, and policy is determined 
at the committee and board level on a monthly 
basis (Bish et al., 2009). The number of local 
representatives elected to the regional board 
is based on the size of a member municipality’s 
population, with a base voting unit for representation 
of 20,000 residents (Bish et al. 2009). At the regional 
scale, tensions often exist between neighboring 
municipalities with different local priorities. It can 
be challenging for board members to put aside their 
own local priorities in pursuit of regional goals, as will 
be explored further in Section 5. 
Secondly, tension also exists between local, 
regional, and provincial governments. In BC, local 
government and regional districts are essentially an 
extension of the provincial government. This system 
of governance was established under the British 
North America Act of 1867 and the Constitution Act 
of 1982. In terms of governance and decision-making, 
the provincial government is the governing body that 
creates, approves and amends legislation that details 
the structure, roles and responsibilities of local 
governments.  It exercises considerable freedom, and 
it may use this freedom to affect local governments 
and regional districts (Bish et al., 2009).  In this 
regard, regional districts and municipalities owe 
their existence to provincial government (Howlett et 
al., 2009). Most of the rules that enable local self-
governance are set forth in the Local Government 
Act, or other acts administered by the Ministry 
of Community, Sports and Cultural Development 
(CSCD).  As will be further explored in Sections 4 and 
5, unilateral decisions by the province further have 
exacerbated ongoing intergovernmental friction and 
continuous lack of coordination of policies.
Reforms to Metro Vancouver’s governing 
capacity and functional responsibilities have 
evolved during the past decades, often in response 
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to local and provincial government requests. While there is a long history of providing utility services such 
as water, sewerage and solid waste on a regional basis, the provision of regional land use planning has been 
more tentative and subject to interruption by the winds of political change. Many of the provincial decisions 
discussed in this paper have dismissed the region’s crucial role in making or implementing land use policy. A 
brief outline of some functional and governance changes is detailed in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Evolution of Metro Vancouver’s Regional Governance Structure and Capacity1 2 3
Date Description of Major Changes 
1911 Burrard Peninsula Joint Sewerage Committee established to manage pollution and sewage disposal.
1914 Greater Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage District (GVSDD) established.
1926 Greater Vancouver Water District (GVWD) established. 
1938 The Lower Mainland Regional Planning Association is established to discuss land use and other matters, which are 
recognized as metropolitan and regional in nature.
1942 The Post-War Rehabilitation Act is passed and makes provision for advancing planning of rehabilitation measures, 
industrial reorganization and employment projects.
1945 Bureau of Post-War Rehabilitation and Reconstruction produces a report on the “Proposed Lower Mainland Regional 
Plan”.
1946 The Provincial planning office (Planning Branch of the Department of Municipal Affairs) is established.
1948 Amendment to the Town Planning Act enables incorporating provisions for “regional areas” and “regional planning 
boards”.
1949 Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board established. The board is tasked with preparing a land use plan, focused on 
future physical development and improvement.
1954 Minister of Municipal Affairs proposes introducing a two-tiered form of metropolitan government at the annual con-
vention of the Union of British Columbia Municipalities.
1957 Metropolitan Joint Commission (MJC) established by the Minister of Municipal Affairs, and conducts research on met-
ropolitan governing arrangements for water supply, sewerage treatment facilities, public health and public hospitals, 
land use planning and regional parks. 
1960 The MJC issues report recommending the formation of a single metropolitan government, but no action is taken on the 
recommendations.
1965 Regional District legislation adopted by the Province, allowing for incorporation of regional districts. Functions such as 
regional land use planning and regional hospital planning become mandatory functions and additional functions are to 
be assigned by Cabinet (if requested by local municipalities). 
1966 Enactment of Regional Parks Act, and Greater Vancouver Parks District is created. 
1966 Lower Mainland Regional Plan approved by the GVRD and by the Province as an official regional growth strategy.
1967 With the Regional Hospital District Act, the Greater Vancouver Regional Hospital District is created.
1968 The Regional District of Fraser-Burrard was renamed the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD). 
1968 GVRD acquires the regional planning function of the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board (LMRPB). Implementa-
tion and administration of the Lower Mainland Regional Plan is assigned to each of the regional districts.
1969 LMRPB dissolved by the province.
1.  Kadota, P. (2010). Evolution of Regional Governance in British Columbia, With Special Focus on Metro Vancouver. The Local  
Government Institute. 
2.  Tindal, C.R., and Tindal, S. (2004). Local Government in Canada. 6th Ed. Scarborough, ON: Thomson Nelson. 86-91. 
3.  Wichern, P.H. (2004). Metropolitan Governance in Canada: The 1990s. In Phares, D. (ed) Metropolitan Governance without 
Metropolitan Government? Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing. 34-54. 
1971 GVRD recommends (in a report) that the region should seek responsibility for operating the public transit system. 
Region applies to the Province to assume the urban transit responsibility. Request is denied.
1971 A Housing function is granted to the GVRD which empowered the Regional District to provide social housing pursuant 
to the provisions of the B.C. Housing Act and the National Housing Act.
1972 Administration of GVSDD, GVWD, and GVPD amalgamated within GVRD, but separate policy bodies are maintained.
1972 The air pollution control function is acquired by the GVRD. 
1972 The Vancouver-Fraser Parks District is dissolved and replaced by adding the parks function to the GVRD’s responsibili-
ties. 
1973 The Agricultural Land Commission is established under provisions of the Land Commission Act and the GVRD is as-
signed a role in the “Agricultural Land Reserve” program.
1975 Livable Region Plan produced by GVRD.
1978 The Ministry of Municipal Affairs appoints the Regional District Review Committee to review function of regional 
districts and to make recommendations on jurisdictional roles, functional responsibilities, political and administrative 
structures, finances and boundaries.
1980 Authority for urban transit transferred to the GVRD.
1983 The GVRD function of urban transit is rescinded by the provincial government. 
1983 With Bill 9, the Municipal Amendment Act, the province eliminates regional districts’ mandatory responsibility for 
regional planning that required compliance by local municipalities.
1985 Provincial legislation centralizes the transit function at the provincial level. 
1988 The City of Langley and the Township of Langley are transferred from the Central Fraser Valley Regional District to the 
GVRD. 
1989 Bill 19, the Municipal Amendment Act, is adopted, enabling Regional Districts to provide regional development services 
(not regional planning services).
1995 The Growth Strategies Statutes Amendment Act (Growth Strategies Act) restores regional planning functions, but only 
on a voluntary basis. 
1995 The GVRD Boundaries are expanded by the province to include both Pitt Meadows and the District of Maple Ridge.
1996 Adoption of the Livable Region Strategic Plan by Metro Vancouver and local governments
1998 Province approves Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Act. This gave the region new powers in transit, major 
roads, air care and transportation demand management, as well as new revenue sources.
2000 Bill 14, the Local Government Statues Amendment Act is passed by the province, providing more flexible service ar-
rangements for regional districts.
2007 Province changes governance structure of TransLink, board now consists of non-elected representatives. 
2011 A special provincial-regional committee created during the development of the RGS.
2011 Adoption of the Metro 2040: Regional Growth Strategy.
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Ultimately, the Fraser Valley Flood of 1948 and rapid 
sprawl at the urban fringes compelled planners to 
push for more collaborative efforts in managing 
growth and natural hazards (Abbot & DeMarco, 2016; 
Peck et al., 2014).  As part of this initiative, the BC 
government created the Lower Mainland Regional 
Planning Board (LMRPB) to lead land use planning in 
the large region extending from Hope to the Strait of 
Georgia.  
One of the key accomplishments of the 
LMPRB (1949-1967) was the first vision plan for 
the future of the region and also one of Canada’s 
1.1 EVOLUTION OF THE 
REGIONAL VISION
Regional collaboration in Metro Vancouver 
first emerged when the City of Vancouver and 
surrounding municipalities amalgamated efforts to 
provide basic services during the mid-20th century.  
Factors including the post-World War II population 
growth and the need for extensive regional 
infrastructure led to inter-municipal initiatives such 
as the Greater Vancouver Water District, the Greater 
Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage District and the 
regional health board (Artibise & Meligrana, 2005). 
Figure 1 Study Area: Metro Vancouver (Metro Vancouver, n.d)
first regional planning documents, titled Chance 
and Challenge (1963) (Harcourt, et al., 2007).  The 
document articulated the need to intervene in 
unregulated sprawl and urban development, and 
advocated for region-wide infill and redevelopment 
of existing urban areas (Taylor & Burchfield, 2010, 
64).  In particular, it introduced and envisioned the 
region “as a series of cities in a sea of green … a 
valley of separate cities surrounded by productive 
countryside” (LMRPB, 1963, 6).  As Harcourt and 
colleagues (2007) describe, 
The words conjured a region that, while 
destined for rapid growth, would always be set 
within a working landscape of farms, forests 
and protected wildlife sanctuaries (28).  
This Vision inspired many significant regional 
initiatives. One example is LMRPB’s A Regional 
Parks Plan for the Lower Mainland which led to the 
establishment of twenty-one regional parks in Metro 
Vancouver.  Another is the Livable Region Strategic 
Plan of 1996 (Harcourt et al., 2007, 28).  
As Senft (2009) reflects, the region has 
cultivated a history of progressive governance and 
civic involvement in land use planning (97).  A pivotal 
moment was the defeat of the proposed freeway 
project into downtown Vancouver in 1967 following 
widespread public resistance and advocacy for 
preserving the livable characteristic of Vancouver 
(Gutstein, 1975; McAllister, 2011).  The great 
“highway debate” is emblematic of the role the public 
plays in moving policy toward preserving the livability 
and sustainability of the region, and demonstrates 
the role of different stakeholders with conflicting 
interests in negotiating policy outcomes as key to the 
staying power of the Cities in a Sea of Green vision.  
The following sections highlight some regional and 
provincial milestones that helped put the Vision into 
practice. 
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within the Growth Strategies Act. This Act established 
a regional planning system that was non-hierarchal 
and emphasized voluntary cooperation between 
regions and municipalities, with the provincial 
government taking on responsibility for ensuring 
“closure” when disputes arose.  The Act enables a 
regional district to adopt a regional growth strategy 
with the purpose to “promote human settlement that 
is socially, economically and environmentally healthy 
and that makes efficient use of public facilities and 
services, land and other resources (LGA, Section 
428(1)). As a point of clarification, the province does 
not approve regional growth strategies and in fact 
has little involvement in their preparation – this is a 
process undertaken by municipalities.
The Act lays out key objectives to which an RGS 
should aspire, including (LGA, Section 428(2)):
(a) avoiding urban sprawl and ensuring that 
development takes place where adequate 
facilities exist or can be provided in a timely, 
economic and efficient manner;
(b) settlement patterns that minimize the use of 
automobiles and encourage walking, bicycling 
and the efficient use of public transit;
(c) the efficient movement of goods and people 
while making effective use of transportation 
and utility corridors;
(d) protecting environmentally sensitive areas;
(e) maintaining the integrity of a secure 
and productive resource base, including the 
agricultural land reserve;
(f) economic development that supports the 
unique character of communities;
(g) reducing and preventing air, land and water 
pollution;
(h) adequate, affordable and appropriate 
housing;
(i) adequate inventories of suitable land and 
resources for future settlement;
deliverable was the Choosing Our Future and the 
Creating Our Future program initiated by Gordon 
Campbell, then Mayor of City of Vancouver and 
Chair of the GVRD planning committee (Abbot and 
DeMarco, 2016). The program was a region-wide 
engagement process on the core values that would 
guide regional planning and cooperation moving 
forward.  Creating Our Future was “validated as the 
agenda for the region” and formed the basis of the 
1996 Livable Region Strategic Plan (Harcourt et al., 
2007, 126).  
1.2.2 Metro Vancouver and the Growth 
Strategy Act (1995 – Present)
As a regional district, Metro Vancouver is 
governed by a 38-member board of directors, which 
consists of mayors and councillors from each of 
the 23 member municipalities and local authorities 
(Metro Vancouver, nd b).  Under the current model, 
the BC government mandates three roles for regional 
districts.  First, they serve as the local government for 
rural areas when local residents vote to have services 
provided this way and to pay for them this way (CSCD, 
2006, 4).  Second, they provide regional governance 
and services through “a political forum for 
representation of regional residents and communities 
and a vehicle for advancing the interests of the region 
as a whole” (CSCD, 2006, 5), as well as the delivery 
of practical services such as economic development, 
water supply, sewerage and waste management 
(CSCD, 2006, 5). Finally, regional districts provide a 
governance framework for inter-municipal and local 
partnerships and cooperation where municipalities 
vote for this route (CSCD, 2006, 5). 
Part of regional districts’ second mandate 
is the delivery of regional growth strategies.  In 
1995, the provincial New Democratic Party (NDP) 
government resurrected regional planning functions 
for the GVRD (now known as Metro Vancouver) 
1.2 REGIONAL 
GOVERNANCE AND  
LAND USE STRATEGIES 
1.2.1 Early Years (1966 – 1983)
The first few decades of regional planning 
were characterized by a series of institutional and 
political changes as detailed in Table 1.   These shifts 
impeded implementation of a consistent planning 
approach.  LMRPB’s first official statutory plan was 
adopted in 1966, titled Official Regional Plan for the 
Lower Mainland Planning, which sought to create a 
“poly-centric” region with “compact regional towns” 
(Abbot & DeMarco, 2016, 3).  However, before 
the plan could be fully implemented, a difference 
of opinion between the province and the region 
regarding intended policy directions eventually led to 
the abolition of the LMRPB in 1968 by the former.  In 
turn, the regional planning functions were inherited 
by the newly established Greater Vancouver Regional 
District (GVRD) in 1965, which released the Livable 
Region Plan in 1975.  
Similar to its predecessor, the GVRD’s planning 
goals and initiatives were short-lived when the BC 
government removed regional planning powers 
from regional districts in 1983 and attributed its 
decision to the deep economic recession (CSCD, 
2006, 7).  In contrast, regional observers argue 
that the provincial government sought to abolish 
GVRD’s planning functions, having engaged in 
some high-profile land use disagreements involving 
GVRD’s land use agenda (Abbot & DeMarco, 2016; 
Harcourt et al., 2007).  Under this organizational 
constraint, GVRD continued to provide voluntary 
advisory support for municipalities in areas of land 
use policy (Abbot & DeMarco, 2016; Harcourt et al., 
2007).  Eventually, the challenges of metropolitan 
planning drove regional leaders and municipalities 
to reconceptualise other possibilities. One such 
(j) protecting the quality and quantity of 
ground water and surface water;
(k) settlement patterns that minimize the risks 
associated with natural hazards;
(l) preserving, creating and linking urban 
and rural open space, including parks and 
recreation areas;
(m) planning for energy supply and promoting 
efficient use, conservation and alternative 
forms of energy;
(n) good stewardship of land, sites and 
structures with cultural heritage value.
In adopting the strategy, the regional 
district is expected to come to an agreement on 
its content through consensus.  In particular, the 
Regional Growth Strategy guideline (CSCD, 2006, 5) 
emphasized the principles of consultation, voluntary 
participation and a non-hierarchal regional-municipal 
relationship. With the passage of the new act, GVRD 
and its member municipalities endorsed the Livable 
Region Strategic Plan (LRSP) in 1996 after “extensive 
negotiations and compromises with municipalities” 
(Abbot and DeMarco, 2016).  
 
 The LRSP set out strategies that would help 
the region accommodate the projected population 
and economic growth, with livability as a central 
priority. The LRSP echoed many goals of the previous 
plans, particularly the Livable Region Plan of 1975 
(Abbot and DeMarco, 2016).  The LRSP distilled four 
interrelated priorities and continue to serve as the 
fundamental long-term regional goals:  
• Protect the Green Zone  
• Build complete communities  
• Achieve a compact metropolitan region; and  
• Increase transportation choice
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By adopting the LRSP and in the spirit of 
the Regional Growth Strategy Act, municipalities 
are expected to align local land use decisions and 
in particular, the local statutory Official Community 
Plans (OCPs), with the LRSP.  
Most recently in 2011, Metro Vancouver 
(formally GVRD) updated the LRSP to strengthen 
the planning instruments and provide for specific 
implementation strategies to the 1996 vision plan.  
The revamped Regional Growth Strategy (RGS), 
titled Metro Vancouver 2040, was developed using 
a sustainability framework.  In addition, the RGS 
also overlaid the region with parcel-based land 
use designations, allowing for a finer and more 
specific outlook on land use. The plan includes five 
key priorities which are reflective of the region’s 
collective aspirations and vision for the future, as 
follows:
1. Create a compact urban area by 
concentrating growth within existing urban 
areas.  This contains urban development 
from sprawling, and supports a more efficient 
transportation network, which reduces 
greenhouse gas emissions,
2. Support a sustainable regional economy by 
protecting industrial and agricultural lands 
and help urban centre commercial activities 
flourish,
3. Protect the environment and respond 
to climate change impacts by protecting 
natural areas in order to support important 
ecosystems, recreational opportunities, and 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
4. Develop complete communities by 
providing diverse housing options and 
supporting mixed-use urban functions within 
neighbourhoods and
5. Support sustainable transportation choices 
through the design of compact urban form, 
expanding opportunities for transit, cycling 
and walking and providing linkages between 
communities for the movement of people and 
goods. 
A RGS guides both municipal and regional decisions 
about growth, change and development, and so once 
an RGS is adopted, all municipalities effected have 
two years to add a “regional context statement” 
(RCS) to the Official Community Plan [LGA s. 866] 
(UBCM, nd). With the adoption of the 2011 RGS, each 
municipality aligned the Official Community Plan 
(OCP) with the RGS. The Regional Context Statement 
serves as a linkage between local and regional land 
use planning and seeks to enhance implementation 
and consistency between local and regional land 
use plans.  Since its inception, the RGS has been 
adopted by all 23 municipalities and local authorities 
in Metro Vancouver.  To ensure consistency with the 
region’s transportation strategies, the LRSP was also 
developed in conjunction with the transportation 
plan, Transport 2021 (see Section 1.3).
1.3 REGIONAL 
TRANSPORTATION 
PLANNING
   Since the late 1980s and leading up to the 
creation of TransLink, there were growing concerns 
about the effects of rapid growth and congestion in 
the region.  As such, the aspirational goals set out 
in the GVRD’s LRSP and Transport 2021 plan were 
perhaps a direct response to the severity of the urban 
development and transportation concerns the region 
was facing that was informed by extensive research 
and public consultation. For example, Transport 2021 
set the target of doubling transit service by 2006 
(Transport 2021, 1993). The Plan was based on the 
values of the region’s residents and communities 
and intended to serve and shape land use patterns 
proposed in the LRSP. This included protecting the 
regional Green Zone, reversing urban sprawl, and 
concentrating growth in city centres. 
 
  Prior to the creation of TransLink in 
1999, transportation governance was divided 
between multiple agencies. Roads were either the 
responsibility of the provincial or local government, 
and transit service was controlled by BC Transit 
and the Vancouver Regional Transit Commission. 
However, with the creation of the Greater 
Vancouver Transportation Authority Act (GVTA) 
in 1998, major roads and transit service would be 
governed simultaneously under one agency – known 
presently as TransLink. The agency was also given 
responsibility for regional transportation planning and 
transportation demand management. 
The prime impetus for creating TransLink came 
from the Greater Vancouver Regional District 
in the mid-1990s when the region approached 
the Province to restructure transportation. This 
was because even though the Province and 
the Region had jointly prepared the Transport 
2021 Medium and Long-Range Transportation 
Plans in 1993, over time it became clear that 
there was considerable ‘drift’ from the Plans’ 
direction. Moreover, the Transport 2021 Plans 
were seen as essential to implementation of 
the Livable Region Strategic Plan (TransLink 
Governance Review, 2013).
Without direct authority or new financial 
capacity, it would have been challenging for the 
region to meet the aspirational goals set out 
within its plans. Therefore, the establishment 
of TransLink not only represented a change in 
governance structure, but also a change in the 
approach to regional planning. TransLink presented 
new opportunities for financing transit and 
transportation in order to shape land use. However, 
intergovernmental challenges and the complex 
arrangement of policy decision-making hinders 
TransLink and the region from advancing its own 
agenda. 
The provincial government has taken leadership 
on various large-scale, capital intensive, projects. For 
example, the Expo Line, Millennium Line, Canada 
Line, the twinning of the Port Mann Bridge, the 
Evergreen Line and most recently the Massey Bridge. 
However, from a regional perspective these acts 
of leadership should be critically evaluated before 
categorically assuming these projects benefit the 
region and anchor the Vision. It is important to 
consider and evaluate the provincial government’s 
motivations for these decisions to determine if 
these acts of leadership were aligned with regional 
plans and strategies, or if they served other - 
perhaps political - motivations. It was concluded in 
a TransLink Governance review that the Province 
has a “dominant influence, sometimes resulting in 
decision-making that is at variance with regional 
and local objectives” (TransLink Governance Review, 
2013).
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a result of this new direction, the province will not 
undertake strategic land use planning in areas where 
it has not taken place already, nor revise and update 
existing plans on a recurring basis (ILMP, 2006).
In the context of the Vision of Cities in a Sea 
of Green, one of the most significant milestones 
delivered by the BC government is undeniably the 
Agricultural Land Reserve (ALR), created 42 years 
earlier through the Agricultural Land Commission 
Act (Harcourt et al., 2007).   The legislation was 
proposed as a response to the rapid encroachment 
of urban development onto farmland in Southern 
BC, as well as the many years of lobbying by the 
LMRPB (Harcourt et al, 2007, 61).  Under this policy, 
agricultural lands zoned as ALR were protected 
from being subdivided or used for non-farming 
purposes unless otherwise exempt.  This instrument 
is considered by Metro Vancouver as effective in 
not only preserving productive agricultural lands, 
but also in containing urban sprawl and promoting 
compact development.  In order to develop an ALR 
land parcel, the landowner must apply for exclusion 
with the Agricultural Land Commission (ALC), the 
provincial independent tribunal which administers 
the ALC Act. 
Constituting around 5% of BC’s land base and 
20% of Metro Vancouver’s land base (Eagle et al., 
2014; Metro Vancouver, 2016, 74), the ALR has 
been instrumental in preserving green spaces in the 
province and the region, and importantly, is integral 
to ensuring regional food sufficiency. For one reason, 
of the 5% of land that is arable in BC, only 1.1% is 
class one or two alluvial soil, suitable for growing 
green produce such as vegetables, and is almost 
entirely found in the Fraser Delta located in the 
southern region of the province (Androkovich, 2013; 
Parry, 2015).
1.4 PROVINCIAL 
MANDATES AND THE 
AGRICULTURAL LAND 
RESERVE
Besides its participation through creating 
and administering the Growth Strategies Act, the 
provincial government’s approach to land use 
planning largely stems from its mandates for Crown 
land and resource management, which are in turn 
guided by legislation including the Land Act, Forest 
and Range Practices Act, Wildlife Act, and Oil and 
Gas Activities Act (Government of BC, 2016). Over 
85% of Crown land is covered by 26 regional land use 
plans and regional Land and Resource Management 
Plans, and 195 Sustainable Resource Management 
Plans (landscapes and watersheds) (Integrated Land 
Management Bureau, 2006). The land use plan 
pertaining to Crown Land in Metro Vancouver is the 
Sea-to-Sky Land and Resource Management Plan 
(Government of BC, 2016b).  
The Integrated Land Management Bureau (ILMB, 
2006) released a strategic direction document on 
land use planning in BC that “reflects current and 
emerging government goals and priorities” (2). ILMP 
(2006) identifies the drive for this new approach 
consisting of new relationship commitments to First 
Nations, major environmental change, exploration 
and development activities, federal government 
initiatives, and new legislation. The first substantive 
change stemming from this document removed 
the need to engage in comprehensive land use 
planning, which was replaced by the requirement 
to demonstrate a business case (ILMP, 2006; 2007). 
Second, the role of public stakeholders was reduced 
from participating in consensus building to a 
consultation role via planning staff (ILMP, 2006). As 
2. HOW ARE WE DOING?
Overall, Metro Vancouver as a region performs 
well in many of its longstanding priorities.  Recent 
literature reflects positively on the progress made 
in the past few decades on the region’s ability to 
encourage mixed dwelling types, promote vibrant 
urban centres, and preserve green spaces through 
the regional parks system and ALR (Hutton, 2011; 
Tomalty, 2002; CSCD staff, August 25, 2016, personal 
communication).  Interview participants also 
described the success stories of the region such 
as waste management, which were hard won and 
required collaboration. That said, they note in some 
cases that the ability for the region to finance and 
move forward on regional goals was constrained by 
lack of direct funding, lack of control of transit, and 
competing interests.
Other researchers and government publications 
help quantify the region’s progress. Burchfield 
and Kramer (2013) and Metro Vancouver (2014, 
35) found that the region has contained most of 
its population and dwelling growth within the 
designated Urban Containment Boundary (UCB) 
and towards the Frequent Transit Development 
Areas.  Between 2001 and 2011, nearly 70% of new 
residents in Vancouver settled in existing urban 
areas through intensification rather than greenfield 
developments, much more so than Greater Toronto’s 
mere 14% (Burchfield and Kramer, 2013, 11). These 
analyses are consistent with Metro Vancouver’s 2014 
progress report.  Furthermore, more than 47% of the 
regional land base is protected under the region’s 
Conservation and Recreation designation (Metro 
Vancouver, 2014, 6).  The fact that the majority of 
these lands are under public ownership allows for 
effective preservation of valuable green spaces 
(DeMarco, cited in Yang, 2016).  The region was also 
successful in diversifying housing stocks, achieving a 
greater balance between single detached homes and 
mid and high-rise apartments (Burchfield and Kramer, 
2013; Metro Vancouver, 2014).  
Despite these accomplishments, the region 
has fallen short on other goals.  As prevalently 
reported, even with a growing supply, the region 
is struggling with housing affordability and high 
vacancy rates (Metro Vancouver, 2014).  The ALR has 
been portrayed in media, academic literature and 
expert interviews as being under threat (Stobbe et 
al., 2011).  In particular, a few participants expressed 
disappointment at the loss of ALR and other non-
urban lands to sprawl and urban development (CSCD 
staff, August 25, 2016; Steves, September 21, 2016; 
Harcourt, August 9, 2016, personal communication).  
They note the troubling correlation between new 
urban developments and land rezoning. One example 
is the completion of the Oak Street Bridge in 1958 
and subsequent rezoning of 12,500 acres of farmland 
as residential.  As will be expanded upon below, 
residential development pressures have also led to 
ALR exclusions. 
With regard to transportation, the region is 
still seeing ongoing automobile dependence and 
increases in traffic congestion. Metro Vancouver 
has made significant progress in reducing car use. 
According to Metro Vancouver’s calculation, in 2011, 
73% of all trips were taken by automobile, while 
transit, cycling and walking had shares of 14%, 11% 
and 2% respectively (Metro Vancouver, 2014, 7).  
A recent survey titled My Health, My Community 
(2016) reports that automobiles make up 55% of 
commute trips to work and school, with transit, then 
walking and cycling, at 28% and 14%, respectively.  
Traffic congestion continues to be a top-of-mind issue 
in the region (Sinoski, 2016 September 8). Before the 
opening of the Evergreen Line in December 2016, 
transit service had dropped from 2.71 service hours 
per capita to just over 2.4 since 2010 (Sinoski, 2016 
September 8). Overall, the 2.1% increase in ridership 
across the system (TransLink, 2015) points to a need 
to provide additional services and infrastructure 
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our agricultural lands. Similarly, between green space 
and agricultural lands we have put a very significant 
value on ensuring the development of our communities 
doesn’t interfere with our ability to grow food or 
our ecology (Corrigan, August 24, 2016, personal 
communication).
[The Vision] shines through all of these documents, 
beginning with the concept of the LRP, the LRSP, even 
Metro Vancouver 2040 - you still have that sense that 
you are building cities as complete communities and 
you are building them in a region that is always going 
to have green spaces (working landscapes, farmland, 
forest, watersheds and parts of the region that will 
never be urbanized because they have a better use as 
something else). That vision is woven through all of 
the planning documents (Cameron, August 10, 2016, 
personal communication). 
That Vision has not changed, the pressures on that 
Vision will continue to mount. We can’t have the 
number of people arriving to live here and work here 
without pressure, because we have a limited land base, 
and that land base is limited in part because of that 
“sea of green” vision.  What has possibly changed is 
the public profile about that discussion, therefore there 
may be lots of people that aren’t aware that there 
has been the historic Vision and that we still aspire 
to in a really significant way (Metro Vancouver staff, 
September 22, 2016, personal communication).
Their feedback suggests that there is a strong 
desire to uphold the longstanding Vision, at least for 
regional stakeholders and provincial bureaucrats.  
Experts agree that the Vision is still relevant, has 
underpinned regional success over the years and is 
a goal to which the region should aspire. The core 
values of the Vision have not changed, and are still 
woven into planning documents.  However, the 
tensions surrounding the utilisation of regional land, 
resources, means of implementation of the Vision 
and diminishing public profile of the Vision remain 
challenges to its physical manifestation on the 
ground.  The following section explores some of these 
pressing concerns in detail.
options for transit users in order to maintain a high 
quality transit system. TransLink further explains the 
severity of measures needed to reduce automobile 
dependency: 
Achieving a 50% non-auto mode share target requires 
that about the same number of auto trips would 
be made in 2045 than are made today, in spite of 
expected population growth. This would require 
major land-use changes enabling all municipalities 
to reduce at least 25% of trip distances to something 
practical and convenient by walking and cycling. It 
would likely require the entire region to exceed the City 
of Vancouver’s current walking and cycling share of 
22.5%. (TransLink, nd). 
As various participants would attest, the Vision 
is still influential and central to the region’s plans.  
At the same time, experts also caution that despite 
previous successes, it is being put to test by a 
variety of causes ranging from growing pressures to 
implementation challenges:
It is the right vision, and although it’s still holding we 
need to be vigilant (CSCD staff, August 25, personal 
communication).
There hasn’t been a movement away from the 
Vision … [but] the Vision isn’t always adhered 
to by municipalities. (Ministry of Transportation 
and Infrastructure staff, July 23, 2016, personal 
communication).
I think [the Vision] is [still influential]. I think that the 
significance of that statement is that first of all it 
appreciates cities, which it doesn’t see itself as being 
one monolithic city but a group of cities who come 
together in a federation to do what’s necessary for the 
regional good. I think that’s been one of the concepts 
that has been the underpinning of the regional success 
over the years. Certainly the idea of our ecology - our 
environment - greenness is something that has been 
part of our philosophy since 1963. We were well 
aware that we were living in a special place and it was 
extremely important for us to protect the assets we 
have. There has been a high priority put on our green 
space by the region from the very beginning and then 
it evolved by the early 1970s into the protection of 
3.1 Development Pressure
To accommodate population growth, Metro 
Vancouver’s RGS has overlain the region with parcel-
based land use designations that allocate spaces for 
anticipated growth.  The land parcels are designated 
as either urban land or non-urban land.  Lands 
with the former designation are contained within a 
defined Urban Containment Boundary (UCB), and are 
intended for compact, urban developments (Metro 
Vancouver, 2011).  Non-urban lands are green spaces 
of significant social and ecological value, including 
those that are designated for Agricultural, Rural and 
Conservation and Recreation uses (Metro Vancouver, 
2011).  
Metro Vancouver, in agreement with member 
municipalities, aims to maintain the UCB in the long 
term by containing at least 98% of all urban growth 
within the boundary until 2040 (Metro Vancouver, 
2014, 33).  In doing so, the region recognizes the 
need to pursue compact design, reduce urban 
sprawl and implement protective measures for 
3. THE VISION: AN 
UNCERTAIN OUTLOOK
As a collection of case studies, this study 
provides evidence of planning challenges currently 
facing the region, driven by economic, political and 
governance factors.  This section will specifically 
explore the case for mounting pressures upon the 
region’s collaborative approach to maintaining our 
Vision in light of the increasing “counter-vision” 
trends, including development pressure on green 
spaces, generating a loss of ALR land base and auto-
dependent transportation projects.  Importantly, as 
evidenced by a number of recent planning and policy 
disputes in the region, there is a weakening support 
for regional priorities in the face of other market 
interests such as application to exempt parcels from 
ALR for residential projects and large-scale expansion 
of port activities.  The lack of political appetite for the 
regional Vision from the BC government and some 
municipalities has further compromised the ability of 
regional players to implement its growth strategy. 
Figure 2 Actual and Projected Population Growth in Metro Vancouver (BC Stats, multiple years).
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commercial space.  Also, the landowner offered to 
transfer an additional 172 ha of agricultural land to 
Delta and create a $9 million drainage and irrigation 
improvement fund (Metro Vancouver, 2014b).  
In response to this request, Metro Vancouver 
staff recommended that the Metro Vancouver Board 
of Directors reject the proposal (Metro Vancouver, 
2014b).  This recommendation was driven by one 
reason: the development would induce dispersion 
of growth in Delta by introducing 2,500 residents to 
the “edge of the region with limited transportation 
options beyond private vehicles” (Metro Vancouver, 
2014b, 275, as cited in Yang, 2016).  In this regard, 
the development violates a fundamental goal 
of the regional plan. In addition, planners were 
also concerned that this amendment could set a 
precedent for private agricultural landowners to 
pursue future development speculation (Metro 
non-urban lands.  However, within three years of 
adopting the RGS, the region has recently seen two 
prominent cases of amendments to the RGS to re-
designate non-urban lands to urban for the purpose 
of accommodating new residential developments.  
These two cases are discussed next.
3.1.1 Delta Southlands
In January 2014, the Corporation of Delta 
(Delta) requested to re-designate 217.5 ha of 
land, known as the Southlands, from its original 
Agriculture designation to Urban (59.7 ha) and 
Conservation and Recreation (42.2 ha) (Metro 
Vancouver, 2014b).  The lands were not in the ALR, 
but were designated Agricultural in both the RGS and 
in Delta’s Official Community Plan (Metro Vancouver, 
2014b). The re-designation would accommodate a 
new project of 950 residential units, as well as new 
Figure 3. Map of proposed changes to Metro Vancouver’s Regional Growth Strategy for the proposed South-
lands development in Delta (Delta Optimist, 2016). 
urban lands at University District.  
 These two case studies exemplify the 
challenge of settling the conflicting land use interests 
of local municipalities and the regional authority at 
the level of specific development proposals, where 
the participants find themselves at the intersection of 
market development interest, local growth pressures, 
municipal objectives, and the regional overarching 
aspiration.  The thinking behind the Growth 
Strategies Act and the regional plans is that harmony 
between regional and local interests should be 
pursued at the level of the regional and local general 
plans through the regional context statements, 
where it is easier to find areas of agreement and 
Vancouver, 2014b, as cited in Yang, 2016).  Despite 
the recommended action from Metro Vancouver 
staff, the Metro Board of Directors ultimately 
approved the amendment with an overwhelming 
vote of 93-31.  A former Metro Vancouver manager 
of planning reasoned that this was a case in which 
regional board directors accepted a trade off in 
regional planning: proponents demonstrated the 
project’s net sustainable development values despite 
violating the RGS goals (Yang, 2016).  
3.1.2 Langley University District
 In 2013, the Township of Langley (‘Langley’) 
adopted a bylaw to amend its Official Community 
Plan to allow a 23.4 ha University District within a 
parcel designated as Green Zone in the LRSP (now 
Agriculture in the new RGS) (Ferguson, 2014).  The 
proposal included a 67-lot, single-family residential 
neighbourhood (Sinoski, 2014).  Previously, Langley 
had applied for ALR exemption from the Agricultural 
Land Commission, which was granted based on the 
land’s lack of agricultural viability (GVRD v. Langley, 
2014, BCSC 414).  
 Metro Vancouver interpreted Langley’s bylaw 
as in conflict with the region’s effort to protect 
non-urban lands and contain urban sprawl (GVRD 
v. Langley, 2014, BCSC 414, as cited in Yang, 2016).  
This disagreement evolved into court action between 
Metro Vancouver and Langley.  The BC Supreme 
Court upheld the validity of Langley’s bylaws, citing 
the limited legal jurisdiction of the RGS (GVRD v. 
Langley, 2014, BCSC 414, as cited in Yang, 2016).  
Unlike Langley’s bylaw that has statutory power, 
Metro Vancouver’s guideline document “does not 
have superiority over land use management within 
the boundaries of a municipality” (GVRD v. Langley, 
2014, BCSC 414, as cited in Yang, 2016).  For this 
reason, the court ruled that Metro Vancouver had no 
authority to prevent the re-designation of the non-
Figure 4 University District Land Re-designation (Metro Vancouver, 
2013, 158)
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resolution. When disputes are played out at the level 
of an individual development proposal, hierarchy 
is used in settling cases, rather than meaningful 
collaboration.  “Local” interests tend to carry more 
weight than “regional” interests in these conflicts.  
Given future growth prospects, one can see how 
this type of municipal-regional disagreement and 
urbanization of green spaces may occur more 
frequently unless concerted effort is made to re-
establish and maintain broad commitment to the 
Cities in a Sea of Green Vision.  For instance, large 
swaths of prime farmland in South Delta are also 
earmarked to be converted for industrial uses in 
maps held by Delta’s planning department (Gyarmati, 
2016).  The next section further investigates the 
provincial government’s role in accommodating 
development on certain lands - particularly those 
held in the ALR. 
3.2 Loss of ALR Land Base
  The debate over some ALR exclusions has 
been described as a “battle” (Sinoski & Shore, 
2013) and as “war” (Spencer, 2016) involving 
environmentalists, developers, land speculators, 
residents, and municipal and provincial government.  
Provincial political and economic interests, 
population growth, urban sprawl, competing land 
use, and land speculation are cited as the driving 
interests behind ALR erosion (Newman et al., 2015; 
Sinoski & Shore, 2013).  The effects of lobbying 
efforts by the development industry and landowners 
are also being felt within the BC government. 
As evidence, the Ministry of Agriculture has on 
numerous occasions taken the position that there are 
better uses of marginal lands “locked” in the ALR.  In 
addition, a federally mandated agency, the Port of 
Vancouver, is seeking to remove land from the ALR 
for port expansion (Duggan, 2015; Sinoski & Shore, 
2013; Spencer, 2016).
ALR boundary changes have occurred over 
the last 42 years.  More than 34,000 ha of land in 
Southern BC (including Metro Vancouver) have been 
removed from the ALR. The addition of more than 
68,000 ha of land in northern BC has kept the net 
provincial extent of the ALR steady (Stobbe et al., 
2011; Francis et al., 2012). Through the passage of 
Bill 24, ALR parcels in BC are designated as either 
zone 1 in the South Coast, Vancouver Island, and 
Okanagan, or zone 2 elsewhere in the province (ALC, 
nd).  Bill 24 has allowed a broader variety of land 
uses on ALR parcels, including those with economic, 
cultural and social objectives, regional planning 
objectives and “other prescribed considerations” 
(Bill 24, 2014).  Further north, the highest quality 
agricultural land in the Peace River District is also 
under threat of farmland loss due to flooding to 
accommodate the newly approved Site C Hydro 
Dam (BC Hydro, 2015). While these decisions do 
not directly affect the Metro Vancouver region, they 
represent incremental provincial reforms which 
weaken the protective measures for land capable of 
growing food in BC.
Only 1% of BC will grow real food, produce like 
vegetables... that land is concentrated in the Fraser 
Valley, Southern Vancouver Island, and Peace River 
(Steves, September 21, 2016, personal communication).
There is a general consensus within the 
academic literature that decision-making at the ALC 
has been pro-development. With the passing of Bill 
24 in 2014 to amend the ALC Act, political action 
has shifted the focus away from preservation of 
agricultural land to the permitting of non-agricultural 
uses without the need for presenting a submission 
to the ALC. Regional panels were created and given 
the power to assess ALR applications (Government 
of BC, 2014). Furthermore, the new law allows new 
regional panels the ability to include economic 
purchasing 97 ha of Richmond ALR farmland near 
the Fraser River next to an existing port terminal 
that handles automobiles and containers (Sinoski, 
2015). In all, the Port purchased 138 ha, with a 
goal of owning 486 ha (Bula, 2012). Concerns 
are heightened as the Port recently warned that 
container traffic through Canada’s Pacific gateway 
is expected to nearly double over the next 15 years 
(Gyarmati, 2016). The Port Authority has suggested 
swapping farmland near ports for potential farmland 
elsewhere (Bula, 2012). It further stated that the ALR 
has emotional, but not economic importance to the 
region. (Gyarmati, 2016; Nagel, 2012). During a 2012 
presentation to the Metro Vancouver board, Port 
of Vancouver CEO Robin Silvester employs a trade-
off narrative by comparing farmland reserves as a 
conflict between economic development and land 
protection:
We need to be thinking more than just about the ALR 
but in addition maybe a job-creation land reserve … 
Something built into the planning process that makes 
sure we will always have land for the economy to grow 
in the future… In the long-term, we can see a challenge 
that just protecting one type of land isn’t going to 
resolve (in Nagel, 2012).
 
 In addition, the Port asserts a constitutional 
pre-eminence as a federal body to overrule municipal 
zoning bylaws, the Regional Growth Strategy, and the 
ALC.  In the past, some municipal councillors have 
also flagged concerns for the Port’s legitimacy for its 
immense power as a non-elected entity (Gyarmati, 
2016). Metro Vancouver political leaders have called 
on the Port to consult with municipalities before 
expanding into their jurisdictions, to settle disputes 
formally through the Port of Vancouver Board, and 
to recognise municipal bylaws and community plans 
(Sinoski, 2015).  Mayor Corrigan of Burnaby describes 
this process as a constant battle: 
criteria in assessments of land use change proposals 
(MacLeod, 2014; Parry, 2015).  The literature 
states that this policy change was undertaken to 
weaken the regulatory power of the ALC in order to 
accommodate private and municipal development 
and economic interests (CBC News, 2015; Hume, 
2015; Hunter & Hume, 2014; Jackson & Holden, 
2013).  
Despite calls from the ALC (2010) and the BC 
Auditor General (2010) to focus on preservation of 
agricultural land, engage in long-term planning with 
local governments and provide more enforcement 
powers to ALC, policy coordination with regional 
districts has also been problematic.  In their case 
study on the exclusion of Jackson Farm from the 
ALR, Jackson and Holden (2013) found that while 
a protocol is in place advising the ALC to consult 
Metro Vancouver on its decisions, this best practice 
procedure is not always followed.   Tomalty (2002) 
comes to a comparable conclusion:
The ALC has pointed out that the Act does not 
provide real provincial policy leadership and leaves 
considerable uncertainty about the practical outcomes 
of the regional planning process.  As well, it lacks 
strong measures to ensure that provincial agencies 
support the regional plans (19). 
 Similarly, the Port of Vancouver has also 
sought to remove land from the ALR for industrial 
expansion. Its relationship with the ALC and local 
municipalities is cast in an adversarial light by media 
accounts. These cases point to the Port’s tendency to 
undermine municipal government agendas, including 
Richmond city council’s attempts to preserve 
farmland and push for divergent infrastructural 
priorities (Duggan, 2015; Nagel, 2012; Sinoski & 
Shore, 2013; Spencer, 2016). 
A high-profile example dates back to 2009 
when the Port frustrated Metro leaders after 
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We need to start making big city decisions. If you are 
going to do logistics and move goods out of the port 
you have to do it at night. You can’t move them during 
the day or at rush hour, you have to change the way 
you do business to accommodate this. The port says 
“no, we’re not doing that we just want you to build 
new capacity”. They want new road and rail capacity 
through the city. So we are fighting these battles 
constantly to protect the public interest (Corrigan, 
August 10, 2016, personal communication). 
3.3 Auto-Dependency 
A central element of the region’s plans has 
been providing more sustainable transportation 
choices as a means to reduce private automobile use, 
its associated pollution effects and urban sprawl (My 
Health, My Community, 2016). TransLink’s 2040 plan 
sets the goal of having most trips (50%) being made 
by walking, cycling and transit by 2045, and having 
the majority of jobs and housing in the region located 
along the Frequent Transit Network, where transit 
service is accessible throughout the day at least every 
15 minutes (TransLink, n.d.). 
In terms of land use and transit access in 
Metro Vancouver, the region has been successful 
at meeting its targets. As of 2012, 54% of regional 
dwellings and 66% of regional jobs were located 
within walking distance of the Frequent Transit 
Network. However, individual behavior has not been 
curbed as successfully as has land use. As of 2011 
walking, cycling and transit modes make up 27% of 
all travel in the region, which is just over halfway to 
the 2045 goal. Meanwhile, automobile drivers and 
passengers account for 73% of all trips as of 2011, 
a decline from the 80% auto mode share in 1985 
(TransLink, n.d). 
In many parts of the region, automobile 
use has decreased since 1999 or remained stable. 
However, other parts of the region, such as Pitt 
Meadows and Maple Ridge, have seen an increase in 
automobile use (TransLink, n.d). The overall presence 
of vehicle congestion and personal vehicle use has 
likely been exacerbated by population growth. Major 
investment in transit infrastructure, outpacing new 
automobile infrastructure, is needed for the region to 
meet its 2045 targets of decreased automobile usage. 
Figure 5 Metro Vancouver mode share trend, 1985-2011 (TransLink, n.d.)
  Late in 2000, the TransLink board of directors 
voted 7-5 in favor of approving the vehicle levy, 
and the GVRD board voted 56-50 to ratify the levy. 
However, the provincial government needed to 
make necessary legal changes that would allow 
the enforcement and collection of the levy, which 
the political leadership ultimately chose not to do. 
The loss of these potential funds meant TransLink 
would not be able to finance the expansion of the 
transportation system quickly enough to meet 
Transport 2021 targets.  
 
  More recent decisions made by the BC 
government had the effect of further disabling 
TransLink’s financial strength and autonomy over 
transit and transportation.  In 2007, legislative 
amendments were made to change the board 
structure of TransLink. The legislative changes 
shifted the board composition from a group of 
locally elected representatives (appointed by Metro 
Vancouver) to an independent board made up 
of candidates from a screened and required list, 
appointed by the Mayors’ Council (TransLink, 2013).  
This system is unaccountable, and not conducive to 
local policy alignment in  decision-making. TransLink’s 
governance model has been described as “unique in 
the world, and not in a good way” as the Province 
has often “exercised a dominant interest, feeling free 
to impose its priorities on the region and reluctant 
to provide a role in transit for local government 
institutions it did not directly control” (TransLink 
Governance Review, 2013). Mayor Gregor Robertson, 
a member of the Mayors’ Council, recently stated 
that “immediate governance changes to TransLink 
are critical” (Johnson & Baluja, 2015). 
In the 2013 election campaign, Premier 
Christy Clark stated that any new taxes to fund 
regional transportation would have to be approved 
in a regional plebiscite. This proposal went against 
the wishes of the Mayors’ Council (Burgmann, 
As infrastructure fall short of these targets, the 
region’s transit capacity will continue to be stretched, 
limiting public transit’s health, environmental and 
economic benefits.  
 
  However, the region’s ability to expand 
sustainable transportation networks has been 
primarily dependent upon various actions at the 
municipal and provincial level. Moreover, comments 
from interview participants suggest that the 
provincial government’s actions often lean toward 
auto-oriented projects. The role and influence of 
provincial government decision making is explored 
further below. 
We [the region] really don’t need the province to have 
its own ideas about what should be the higher priority, 
really we’d prefer the province to not have ideas about 
whether roads versus transit should be built at any 
given point in time. We don’t have that kind of ideal 
condition obviously. So you have a situation where 
there are competing views between the province and 
local government as for the priority for transit and for 
the priority for the mix of roads and transit investment 
that is appropriate [in] the development of the region. 
That’s how you get the Gateway program and the 
Massey bridge (Cameron, Aug 10 2016, personal 
communication). 
 
3.3.1 TransLink’s Barriers to Success: 
Governance and Financing 
Since TransLink’s inception, the organization 
has faced various governance and financing hurdles. 
Shortly after TransLink began operating in 1999, 
both TransLink and the GVRD went through the 
process of seeking approval to implement a vehicle 
levy in Metro Vancouver to finance new transit 
infrastructure across the region. This represented a 
‘user-pay’ model highlighted in the region’s strategic 
plan Transport 2021, which would ensure that 
automobile users were paying into the system in a 
manner similar to transit users.  
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approval. For example, a referendum was not called 
for the planned $3.5-billion bridge across the Fraser 
River (discussed below in Section 4) (Smith, 2016). 
The provincial government’s inconsistent approach 
to financing transit and transportation projects will 
likely further frustrate land use planning problems, 
since certain transportation projects (e.g., expanding 
road capacity) tend to encourage urban sprawl.   
 Over a year later, the key players in this 
issue are still not cooperating. The province and the 
Mayors’ Council released separate funding proposals 
in May 2016, and it was reported that “it remains 
unclear if and when they will find common ground” 
(Laanela, 2016). In addition to proposing an increased 
financial capacity, the mayors are also calling for 
local elected leadership of TransLink instead of the 
provincially-appointed board (Laanela, 2016).  The 
province’s inconsistent approach to transit and 
transportation embodies a decision making process 
that does not appear to be well aligned with the 
interests of the region, or its Vision: 
The whole conversation around public transit has been 
uniquely destabilizing for Metro Vancouver’s long term 
vision as reflected in our Regional Growth Strategy. 
That is a vision in which land use and transportation 
are completely and totally integrated. The whole 
refusal to come up with any kind of productive results 
around the funding of public transit has been conflict 
ridden and remains unresolved (Metro Vancouver staff, 
September 22, 2016, personal communication).  
2015). The 2015 plebiscite on a $7.5-billion regional 
transportation plan was depicted as a struggle 
between TransLink, the Mayors’ Council and the 
provincial government. Voters were asked whether 
they were for or against a new 0.5 per cent sales 
tax to help fund major transportation infrastructure 
projects. The proposition failed to win majority 
support (Johnson & Baluja, 2015; Lupick, 2015). 
TransLink’s CEO Doug Allen characterized the loss 
as a vote against higher taxes, and not against 
TransLink or improved transit service itself (Johnson 
& Baluja, 2015).  However, critics and government 
have repeatedly painted TransLink the organisation 
as wasteful and lacking accountability (Bateman, 
2015; Klasson, 2015; Travis, 2015). This is despite 
TransLink’s international reputation as one of North 
America’s most cost-effective transit agencies (Ward, 
2015). In fact, the Mayors’ Council proposed a Public 
Accountability Committee headed by businessman 
Jim Pattison during the referendum in an attempt 
to reassure the public that the $7.5-billion would be 
properly spent (CBC, 2015b).  
 
   The plebiscite was unsuccessful.  Public 
trust in TransLink was diminished, TransLink’s 
top leadership was fired, and funding for transit 
lags behind needs (Lee, 2015; Ward, 2015). Key 
supporters of the “Yes” side (in favour of the tax) 
did not want the tax-financing strategy to be a 
referendum question because tax-increases are a 
difficult policy to sell.  Moreover, by downloading 
the decision to the public, the provincial government 
insulated itself from political fallout (Ward, 2015). 
The pitfalls of referenda are well recognised: 
referenda and plebiscites are often not seen as the 
right way to set policy, since policy making requires 
trade-offs which are oversimplified in referenda 
(Ward, 2015). Confusingly to many, other major 
transportation projects that require provincial 
investment are not subject to a public vote of 
Region Coalition and Better Environmentally Sound 
Transportation have also expressed opposition 
through Metro Vancouver’s Land Use and 
Transportation Committee (Metro Vancouver, 2006b, 
2):
Gateway program proposals to expand general 
purpose traffic capacity through the twinning of the 
Port Mann Bridge and widening of Highway 1 west 
of the bridge are inconsistent with the Livable Region 
Strategic Plan, and therefore the GVRD Board strongly 
opposes the freeway expansion project and twinning of 
the Port Mann Bridge. (Metro Vancouver, 2006, 10).
 Even with a hard stance against massive 
road expansion projects among local municipalities, 
the BC government is still moving forward with its 
Gateway vision, most recently, through the George 
Massey Tunnel Replacement project (GMTR), which 
is introduced in the section below.    
3.3.2 Gateway Program
The Gateway Program is evidence of the 
province’s tendency to support automobile-
dependent projects that sap the viability of more 
sustainable projects such as public transit (Hutton, 
2011). In 2006, BC Premier Gordon Campbell 
unveiled a comprehensive $3 billion plan to open 
up the province’s transportation network in 
Vancouver.  This plan included the expansion of 
the Port Mann Bridge and South Fraser Perimeter 
Road.  Furthermore, the plan states that “congestion 
is having an increasingly negative effect on BC’s 
economy, communities and families” and “is a wide-
ranging plan to meet the needs of our growing 
economy, increasing Asia-Pacific trade and a growing 
population.”  Existing bridges and highways in the 
Lower Mainland are perceived as operating well 
beyond designed capacities. Gateway projects 
include the completed South Fraser Perimeter 
Road, Port Mann Bridge expansion and widening 
of Highway 1, as well as $50 million in cycling 
infrastructure.  
The Gateway project met a mixed reception 
in the region.  In response to the twinning of the 
Port Mann Bridge, the Metro Vancouver board 
voted in favour of a motion against the province’s 
preoccupation with expanding “general purpose 
traffic capacity” through the Gateway projects 
(Metro Vancouver, 2006, 11).  Despite the region’s 
unified response against the provincial strategy, it 
is important to note that initial board votes also 
reflected a few municipalities’ desire for expansion 
of road capacity. This was particularly the case for 
those municipalities whose population relies heavily 
on single occupancy vehicles to get to work, such as 
Surrey, Langley and Maple Ridge (Metro Vancouver, 
2006, 10).  Various interest groups including the 
David Suzuki Foundation, Smart Growth BC, Livable 
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4.1 The Proposal - Ten Lane Toll Bridge 
In December 2015, the BC government 
unveiled its plan for the George Massey Tunnel 
Replacement project (GMTR), which would replace 
the Massey Tunnel with a 10-lane toll bridge valued 
at $3.5 billion, with construction to begin in 2017 
and complete by 2022 (Government of BC, 2015).  
The decision to replace the tunnel with a bridge 
emerged from a 2012 study of options commissioned 
by the provincial government, which cited safety 
concerns about the ageing tunnel, as well as chronic 
congestion in and near the tunnel (Government 
4. CASE STUDY:  
GEORGE MASSEY 
TUNNEL REPLACEMENT 
PROJECT 
 
 This case study is featured as the most pertinent 
and timely in this report, given public interest and 
dialogue, divided municipal support, and the ongoing 
nature of the replacement project. Various elements 
of the preceding case studies are echoed, and in some 
cases intersect with this case study. 
Figure 6 George Massey 
Tunnel Replacement 
Project (BC Environmen-
tal Assessment Office, 
2017)
4.2 Support for the Project
 Stakeholder support for GMTR is 
concentrated among the Corporation of Delta, the 
Tsawwassen First Nation, the Vancouver Fraser 
Port Authority, the local Chambers of Commerce, 
and businesses (Gyarmati, 2016; Li, 2016). In its 
consultation summary report, the BC government 
says it found “general support for the Project overall” 
(2016, 5) from its consultation participants.  Project 
staff at open houses in Richmond and Delta have 
noted overall public support for the new bridge.  The 
Corporation of Delta has also endorsed the project, 
noting the importance of “bottleneck relief” for 
commuters travelling between South of the Fraser 
and Richmond (Yeung, 2016). 
In particular, industry advocacy groups such 
as the Vancouver Board of Trade, Richmond Chamber 
of Commerce and the BC Trucking Association also 
showed the greatest level of support (Black et al., 
2016).  Given their mandates on trade and business 
development, these stakeholders are concerned 
about current traffic in and around the tunnel and 
the resulting economic inefficiency. To them, an 
infrastructural response is essential to sustain future 
business operations and capture opportunities in the 
emerging Asia Pacific market. 
4.3 Opposition to the Project
One of the main arguments in opposition 
to the proposed bridge is that this infrastructure 
investment will privilege and reinforce automobile 
usage with the allocation of public resources to roads 
away from transit. Most importantly, it represents 
a prevailing countermovement to the Vision that 
is held strongly by Metro Vancouver and its local 
municipalities.
 
of BC, 2015).  Specifically, in its project definition 
report (2015), the provincial government laid out the 
following rationales and objectives for a new bridge: 
1. Improving safety: The BC government states 
that the tunnel built in the 1950s does not 
meet modern safety and seismic standards.  
The design of the corridor also makes it prone 
to high rates of traffic collisions.
2. Relieving congestion: The corridor, along with 
its connectors Highway 99 and Alex Fraser 
Bridge, has been experiencing increasing 
queues and congestion.  In anticipation of 
future population growth, the BC government 
is of the view that transit alone will be unable 
to accommodate the resulting traffic.
3. Supporting goods movement: The tunnel 
serves as a significant transportation corridor 
that connects the regional economy and is 
integral to economic development south of 
the Fraser River.  The government argues that 
additional capacity is required to prevent 
further delays in the transport of goods.  
The report also proposes a clearance space 
alongside the new bridge, which would 
accommodate more intensive use of Port 
of Vancouver sites on the South Arm of the 
Fraser River.
4. Increase transit: The proposal intends to 
include a dedicated transit and HOV lane to 
accommodate transit service expansion. 
The replacement project has received 
polarized support and opposition in the region.  
While representatives of Delta and various industry 
groups are enthusiastic about the expanded capacity, 
strong opposition has been voiced by the Richmond 
City Council and the Metro Vancouver Board, as well 
as citizen and environmental groups (Little, 2016; 
Quinn, 2016). The following subsections provide an 
overview of the responses of different stakeholders 
and regional entities.  
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Specifically, Metro Vancouver raised the 
importance of “aligning projects designed to increase 
highway capacity” with the Metro Vancouver 2040 
RGS, which emphasizes compact communities and 
an efficient transit network (Metro Vancouver, 
2016, 4).  The proposed bridge and the resulting 
expansion of vehicle capacity would potentially alter 
the distribution of growth, traffic and locational 
choices of businesses and households. This will 
increase pressures for land use conversion and 
shift existing regional and municipal plans (Metro 
Vancouver, 2016, 3-5).  An interview participant from 
Metro Vancouver remarked on the absurdity of the 
project:  
They jumped straight to a bridge - a really large bridge, 
a bridge that doesn’t really do anything to support 
public transit, and a bridge that will likely have fairly 
significant impacts on agricultural land loss and 
some kind of redistribution of population settlement - 
seems to come to from a place that can only point to 
some kind of ulterior motive (Metro Vancouver staff, 
September 22, 2016, personal communication).  
Given these concerns, Metro Vancouver 
requested that the Ministry of Transportation and 
Infrastructure (MOTI) take the necessary steps to 
mitigate the impacts (Metro Vancouver, 2016, 1).  
Metro Vancouver Board Chair and Port Coquitlam 
Mayor Greg Moore reiterated the regional district’s 
argument against the GMTR:
The project represents an expansion of the car-
oriented infrastructure and diverts crucial funds from 
transportation projects that support the Regional 
Growth Strategy (Metro Vancouver, June 29, 2016, 1).  
 
 Contrary to the BC government’s view, Moore 
and many municipal counterparts are of the opinion 
that the region cannot build itself out of congestion.  
The expanded capacity would attract more single-
occupancy vehicles in the long term, which would 
eventually result in congestion (Moore, Interview 
with Global News, June 29, 2016). 
The Gateway program was supposedly to open up the 
arteries of the region so trade and goods could flow ... 
Really it was a mask for a suburban commuter oriented 
set of road improvements (Cameron, August 10, 2016, 
personal communication).
Metro Vancouver
  In a report released in June 2016, Metro 
Vancouver identified the potential regional impacts 
of the GMTR project and asserted its opposition.  
The report offers a very different interpretation 
of the benefits and costs of the project from the 
BC Government’s Project Definition Report and 
highlights the following concerns (Metro Vancouver, 
2016, 1): 
1. Insufficient consideration of alternatives to 
the project.
2. Lack of integration into the RGS and 
transportation network.
3. Ecological disruption to the Fraser River 
estuary.
4. Impacts on Metro Vancouver infrastructure, 
including water mains and sewer lines.
5. Recreational and ecological disruption on 
Deas Island Regional Park.
6. Downloading of major expenditures onto 
local governments for road improvements.
7. Negative effects on transit ridership and 
affordability.
8. Insufficient consideration to climate change 
and air quality.
9. Lack of transparency and consultation with 
respect to project design and business case.
10. Optimistic scenarios for BC government’s 
impact analysis.
on the Fraser River and its delta.  Steves (2016b) 
cited the potential loss of major habitat for fisheries 
and over 1200 ha of farmland which would be ceded 
by Port of Vancouver for the project.  
4.4 Role of Economic Drivers
 In addition to enhancing safety and relieving 
traffic congestion, observers agree that a significant 
motivator for the BC government to proceed with a 
new bridge is the desire to accommodate the Port 
of Vancouver’s plan for expansion as well as the 
desire to provide for industry and large infrastructure 
projects.  As part of the Gateway program, which 
in itself prioritizes roadway projects over public 
transit, the GMTR is seen by some as an attempt by 
the province to enhance BC’s road transportation 
capacity and its strategic economic role as the 
Gateway to Asia Pacific.  Findings from Richmond City 
Councillor Harold Steves’ Freedom of Information 
Act request for correspondence regarding the bridge 
proposal from MOTI include the following (2016b):
FOI information shows a concerted effort was made in 
2012 by Fraser Surrey Docks and Port of Vancouver and 
others to have the tunnel removed to accommodate 
deep draft Panamex supertankers. The BC Government 
met with them to discuss tunnel removal on Feb 2, 
2012, future terminals at VAFFC [Vancouver Airport 
Fuel Facilities Corporation], Lehigh and a new one in 
Richmond, including liquid bulk tankers (e.g. LNG); and 
the need to dredge the river to 15.5 metres on Dec. 4, 
2012. 
 
On Nov 5, 2015, Minister Todd Stone admitted that 
they did not yet have a business case for a bridge. 
Now the reason is clear. It appears that the Province 
changed their plans to permit the industrialization of 
the Fraser River by Port of Vancouver. They did not 
have a business plan for a bridge because the business 
case was for twinning the tunnel and providing Rapid 
Bus.
 
 In support of this theory, Steves referenced 
In fact, the Metro Vancouver board, along 
with the City of Richmond, had requested the federal 
Minister of Environment and Climate Change to order 
a federal environmental assessment in addition to 
the provincial process to allow for a more rigorous 
and impartial review (Metro Vancouver, 2016c).  
This request was rejected by the federal minister, 
on the grounds that GMTR is not within the federal 
mandate, that the provincial process provides 
sufficient due diligence (Wood, February 14, 2017) 
and that federal departments have already given 
their input during the consultation stage (Gyarmati, 
2017).
Metro Vancouver Municipalities
With the exception of Delta, the majority of 
municipalities in the region have openly expressed 
opposition to the plan to construct a new bridge.  In 
chorus with Greg Moore, Richmond Mayor Malcolm 
Brodie argues that the bridge will increase demand 
for private vehicles and facilitate urban sprawl south 
of the Fraser River. These anticipated impacts would 
contradict key goals within the RGS.  Burnaby Mayor 
Derek Corrigan (Sinoski, 2016) and North Vancouver 
Mayor Darrell Mussatto (CBC, 2016) have articulated 
similar views.  Langley City councillor Nathan Pachal 
argues against the bridge from an alternative angle.  
He notes that plans to toll the Massey Bridge will 
likely push drivers to alternatives with no toll – as 
with the reaction to the new Port Mann Bridge toll 
(Woodward, 2016).  In this regard, tolling would 
create a spillover of drivers to the Alex Fraser Bridge, 
exacerbating current congestion and delays. 
In a written public comment to the provincial 
government, Richmond Councillor Harold Steves 
(2016b) maintains that the scope of the province’s 
environmental review is too narrow, since it concerns 
only the transportation corridor, but does not 
consider the consequential industrialization impact 
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(Corrigan, August 24, 2016, personal communication).
It’s linked to LNG, or future economic opportunities. It 
does seem to be a decision being made not with the 
needs of the lower mainland as a region as the point 
of departure in the decision making process but one 
that’s possibly linked to provincial or national interests 
(Metro Vancouver staff, September 22, 2016, personal 
communication). 
The BC EAO has attempted to address this 
speculation in its Summary Assessment Report (2017) 
by responding to the “concern that the purpose of 
removing the Tunnel is to deepen the channel [and] 
accommodate further industrialization of the Fraser 
River” (19): 
MOTI clarified during the EA that the rationale for 
removing the Tunnel is to eliminate the future risk of 
damage to the new bridge and impact to shipping 
associated with significant future seismic activity; to 
meet MOTI’s best practice regarding management of 
obsolete infrastructure; and to provide opportunities 
to restore Fraser River habitat … During the EA, the 
Vancouver Fraser Port Authority [Port of Vancouver] 
confirmed that the port authority has no plans to 
dredge the Fraser River to create a wider or deeper 
navigation channel.
Nonetheless, the EAO fails to acknowledge 
the full context of the port authority’s response 
(November 15, 2017, 2) which allows for a much 
more open interpretation of their future plans: 
The port authority currently has no plans to dredge 
the Fraser River to create a wider or deeper navigation 
channel. However, sometimes projects may be 
proposed on port authority managed lands or waters 
that call for new dredging to accommodate vessels that 
are larger than what an existing navigation channel or 
berth was designed to accommodate. 
a series of documents which show the evolution of 
how the “Massey plan” shifted from a twinning of 
the tunnel to a new bridge (Steves, 2016b).  In 2006, 
Richmond Council was consulted on the original 
plan to expand the Massey Tunnel through twinning 
(Steves, 2016). Prior to that, the BC government had 
already invested $22.2 million on seismic upgrade 
of the tunnel and announced plans to introduce 
rapid bus lines along the corridor to reduce traffic. 
Former Transportation Minister Kevin Falcon also 
assured Richmond City that the tunnel was “good for 
50 years” (Steves, 2016b).  Given this development, 
it seemed clear that the intention was to enhance 
the tunnel, until Port of Vancouver expressed its 
preference for a new bridge to allow for marine 
traffic and considerations for future terminals in 
the south arm of Fraser River (Steves, 2016b).  For 
Steves, these FOI documents further reinforce the 
BC government’s stance towards industry (Steves, 
2016b).  
Many other regional leaders share similar 
views.  Mayor Corrigan believes that the bridge 
is motivated by business, and notes the “high 
status” and “significant power” possessed by the 
Gateway lobby group (August 24, 2016, personal 
communication).  Interviewees including former 
Premier Harcourt (August 9, 2016; Metro Vancouver 
staff, September 22, 2016, personal communication) 
also reason that fulfilling the Gateway Program is 
a strong reason for the BC government to proceed 
with a bridge.  After all, the Port of Vancouver is a 
significant driver of the BC economy and plays an 
integral part in Canada’s international trade network 
(Harcourt, August 9, 2016, personal communication).  
 
[The Gateway lobby group] represents a large amount 
of business interests that are involved with the Port, 
in the railways, in the operation of logistics, in all of 
those elements...The government has no hesitation in 
spending public money to give them what they want. 
problematic, however, is that the views of other 
significant players such as Metro Vancouver, 
municipalities and environmental groups were not 
captured in this dialogue, but instead through written 
submissions.  In particular, Steves (September 21, 
2016, personal communication) remarks: “In one 
meeting we were invited to, everyone there was 
from Chambers of Commerce, we were the only 
Council representatives.  They [other participants] 
were delighted to hear about the bridge proposal”.
In addition, regional observers reflected 
on the lack of “real” and respectful consultation.  
Instead, most engagement sessions were superficial 
meetings. Substantive expressions of positions 
occurred through official written statements 
rather than interactive dialogues. Reflecting on the 
engagement experience, a Metro Vancouver staff 
recalled ongoing delays in providing substantive 
information:  
The project definition was finally released just before 
Christmas last year, we were given four weeks to 
respond and two of those weeks were right in the 
middle of the Christmas period when Councils and 
boards are not in session.  There has been politicking 
going on and no sign of a proactive duty to consult. 
As reflected by the excerpts below, multiple 
regional politicians share their frustration over a lack 
of information, changes in the consultation process, 
and lack of alternative options being provided and 
discussed:
The consultation on the decision around the bridge 
with Metro Vancouver was never there. It was never 
there with the rest of the Province. They [the Province] 
originally said we will come up with 5 options, we are 
going to research and analyze those 5 options, then we 
will select a preferred alternative. Then they skipped 
that whole step of looking at the options and selecting 
a preferred alternative. They just went straight to it 
and said “by the way it’s a bridge”. Even though we 
4.5 Question of Consultation and 
Transparency
In addition to the problematic nature of the 
project itself, the BC government’s consultation 
approach has been regarded as lacking transparency, 
completeness and neutrality.   In response to these 
speculations of ulterior motive, lack of transparency 
and Port of Vancouver’s role, BC Transportation 
Minister Todd Stone maintained the sufficiency 
of provincial-regional communication, and that 
the province is “moving ahead with it because it 
addresses one of the most congested points in 
British Columbia” (Sinoski, March 16, 2016).  Stone 
further adds that the province has had more than 
“70 meetings with officials in Delta, Richmond and 
Port Metro Vancouver” (Sinoski, March 16, 2016).  As 
well, in March 2016, the BC Government published 
the Consultation Summary Report on the project, 
which referenced “general support for the Project 
overall” (BC Government, 2016, ii).  Upon closer 
inspection of the report, however, the process 
contains significant gaps. 
For instance, there was a disproportionate 
representation of industry among the stakeholder 
groups.  Of the nine groups surveyed, five have 
strong links to the business community including 
Vancouver Board of Trade Transportation Committee, 
Richmond Chamber of Commerce Board of Directors, 
BC Trucking Association, Rotary Club of Steveston 
and Richmond Farmers Institute. The latter stated 
a conditional “general support, given no net loss 
of farmland” (9).  Cycling groups and the City of 
Richmond Active Transportation Committee also 
offered views on the proposed bike path along 
the new bridge (BC Government, 2016, 4).  These 
groups offered mostly favourable feedback on the 
project, which is not unexpected considering that 
the project aligns with their mandates.  What is 
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4.6 Approval and Ongoing Debate
Following a 6-month review of the project 
application led by the BC Environmental Assessment 
Office (EAO), the Environment Minister and 
Community, Sport and Cultural Development Minister 
issued an Environmental Assessment Certificate to 
GMTR in February 2017, subject to 33 legally binding 
conditions (BC Government, 2017).  These conditions 
include requirements on reporting and document 
submissions (compliance, plan development, 
document review, etc.), mitigation actions on 
managing impacts on wildlife, vegetation, fish, 
hydrology and cultural sites, continued engagement 
and consultation with Aboriginal peoples and other 
government agencies (Government of BC, 2017b).
The Ministers’ Reasons for Decision report (EAO, 
2017, 1) concurred with the EAO’s findings that:
The proposed EA Certificate conditions and Project 
design would prevent or reduce potential adverse 
environmental, social, economic, heritage or health 
impacts of the Project, such that no significant adverse 
effects are expected.  
(Metro Vancouver) have serious concerns with some 
of the aspects of that decision (Metro Vancouver staff, 
September 22, 2016, personal communication). 
 
The Province considers meetings to be consultation, 
so they constantly trip out the number of meetings 
they have. The reality is that consultation needs to be 
done on the front end of considering a project, when 
considering the implications of a project before you 
commit to it… Meaningful consultation doesn’t occur… 
Consulting after you’ve already made a decision means 
there was no consultation (Corrigan, August 24, 2016, 
personal communication).  
 
Yes, they would meet with us but every time we met, 
it was “we have been delayed, let’s just talk around 
the edges about the kind of things we might want 
to consider.” There is meeting, and there is meeting 
and actually talking about something. In my mind, 
consultation would require the latter to be in place 
(Metro Vancouver staff, September 22, 2016, personal 
communication). 
Consultation means that you are consulting with 
people who leave all of the cards on the table.  That 
wasn’t the case. Cards were still left in the pack (Steves, 
September 21, 2016, personal communication).
 
Further to its conclusion, in its Summary Assessment 
Report (2017b), the EAO identified the reasons for 
which the GMTR application has met its expectations, 
including: 
•	 The environmental assessment process has 
“adequately identified and assessed the 
potential adverse environmental, economic, 
social, heritage and health effects of GMTR” 
(24);
•	 Adequate consultation with Aboriginal 
groups, federal, provincial and local 
government agencies;
•	 Issues identified by the above stakeholders 
were “adequately and reasonably addressed 
during the review of the Application” (24); 
and
•	 Practical means were identified to prevent 
and reduce potential adverse impacts of 
GMTR.
There is no question that some regional stakeholders 
would beg to differ on several of these bold 
statements and would maintain that the proposed 
GMTR requires further examination and meaningful 
consultation between the BC government and 
regional entities.  Others, such as Mike Harcourt 
(2017) and Minister of Transportation and 
Infrastructure Todd Stone (2017), have embarked on 
a direct exchange – through opinion editorials – of 
the science and economics behind their polarizing 
views on GMTR.  As will be elaborated in the next 
section, regardless of what each side possesses 
in sound evidence and scientific data, the case of 
GMTR has only revealed a troubling and longstanding 
ideological and communication stalemate between 
stakeholders.   
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& Meligrana, 2013).  For Walisser and colleagues 
(2013), regional districts can sometimes become 
“arenas of contention” (156) as local politicians 
struggle to make headway at this level of governance 
when the “incentive of mutual benefit cannot 
overcome differences of interest”.  As the Metro 
Vancouver region is poised to experience significant 
population and economic growth, the debate on 
issues such as urbanizing greenfield areas and 
increasing road and bridge capacity carry high stakes. 
Some interview participants commented that in some 
cases, the regional Vision has not been translated to 
the local level, as it is “not always adhered to by the 
municipalities” (MOTI Staff, July 23, 2016, personal 
communication). Others offer that it is the translation 
of the Vision up the hierarchy of government, to the 
Province, which is sorely lacking.
The two case studies in which municipalities 
challenged regional land use designations represent 
this tension and failure of translation.  In the case 
of the University District development in Langley, 
the different levels of government were unable to 
reconcile their land use priorities, which ultimately 
led to a legal dispute.  The fact that Langley’s 
Official Community Plan takes precedence over the 
RGS signals an enormous uncertainty of regional 
planning, a policy gap which may become even 
more pronounced in the future as growth persists.  
As such, the two cases have triggered region-wide 
debates over the balance between local autonomy 
and regional interests in long-term, coordinated 
planning.  There appear to be divided opinions 
between municipalities with greater physical growth 
potential in greenfield areas and those already 
urbanized.  On one hand, some municipalities located 
south of the Fraser River including Surrey and Langley 
place high value on local autonomy in parcel-based 
land use decisions (Sinoski, October 11, 2013).  On 
the other hand, cities such as Burnaby and North 
5. SYSTEMIC 
CHALLENGES IN 
REGIONAL GOVERNANCE 
AND PLANNING
The discussion of the George Massey Tunnel 
Replacement project and other case examples show 
the tenets of the Vision holding their position in 
regional and many local minds and policy, while 
policy decisions, rationales and actions diverge at 
the provincial scale. Experts interviewed noted 
that while the core values of compact urban form, 
complete communities and preserving green spaces 
have persisted, different values have been used to 
justify actions on the ground (e.g., development of a 
commuter bridge to accommodate anticipated traffic 
growth, and trading ALR land for more economically 
productive port-related uses). Likewise, the guiding 
principle of collaboration remains the official 
position of the affected levels of government, even 
though the dynamics between actors are contested. 
This dissonance puts strain on intergovernmental 
collaboration and working relationships between 
those making key decisions that affect our regional 
Vision and path. In examining these dynamics, 
this study interpolates some of the overarching 
systemic issues that challenge sound cooperation 
and implementation of the longstanding Vision, and 
causes conflict that confounds our regional progress.  
5.1 Negotiating a Collaborative Regional 
Governance System through Differences
While there is strong consensus that BC’s 
regional district system is successful in facilitating 
service delivery, the same system is less effective 
for decision-making in the face of controversial 
regional challenges (Walisser et al., 2013; Artibise 
each other’s local interests in the decision-making 
process as a means to ensure that their local interest 
will be protected in return (Yang, 2016, 30).  This 
practice of “logrolling” is seen as a contributor to the 
outcome in the Delta Southlands case (Yang, 2016, 
30). Expectedly, this places outcomes that benefit the 
region as a whole at a disadvantage to outcomes that 
offer an uneven distribution of benefits to specific 
municipalities. 
Moreover, in BC, the Local Government Act 
emphasizes local autonomy in land use decision-
making (Smith, 2009; Artibise & Meligrana, 2005).  
Regional districts serve as forums for deliberation, 
and to fill in planning gaps between municipalities, 
and do not have authority to enforce policies on 
member municipalities in the absence of a municipal 
vote to seek specific regional contributions.  In this 
regard, the Vision of the RGS can be interpreted as 
only just that – an elusive image of a desirable goal, 
that carries no legal weight when it comes down to 
specific land use decisions made by municipalities 
(Hodge and Robins, 2001).  Metro Vancouver has 
traditionally relied on moral persuasion to impact 
municipalities’ willingness to implement such 
voluntary agreements (Tomalty, 2002). This may 
no longer be sufficient. The GVRD v. Langley ruling 
has shown that municipalities reserve the statutory 
authority to conduct land use changes that could be 
contradictory to the regional plan (GVRD v. Langley, 
2014, BCSC 414).  Besides respecting local autonomy, 
numerous urban governance researchers suggest 
that the BC government has reduced its involvement 
in local and regional affairs to allow for diffusion of 
power. At most, the provincial government may serve 
as a mediator and facilitator in a dispute resolution 
process between local governments (Yang, 2016).  
This arrangement, as opposed to a concentration of 
strong political voices, diffuses the public’s ability 
to question provincial interests (Abbot & DeMarco, 
Vancouver see a greater need to respect the regional 
plan.  As Mayor Corrigan cautioned, the Langley 
Township v. GVRD decision may have set a precedent 
whereby other municipalities will seek to exercise 
pressure on the ALC for land exclusion (Sinoski, 
October 11, 2013). 
Edge planning is the prerogative of the local 
government, not the regional government. We 
have significant edge farming policies in our 
city and where we develop. - Former Surrey 
City Councillor Linda Hepner on the Langley 
land use re-designation case (Sinoski, October 
11, 2013).
[Municipalities are] defending their own 
turfs – and it’s not always consistent.  It is a 
region that is interrelated, yet when you talk 
to municipalities you would think they have 
quite differing philosophies (MOTI staff, July 
23, 2016, personal communication). 
In fact, intergovernmental disagreements are 
what Hodge and Robinson (2001) predict as the “true 
test” for regional planning in Metro Vancouver.  The 
collaborative regional governance system is designed 
to ensure that all local governments - municipal 
and regional alike – negotiate toward agreement 
on regional decisions (Kellas, 2010).  The downside 
of this decision-making system is that members are 
drawn into debates on controversial policy problems 
where benefits and costs are not evenly distributed 
(Walisser et al., 2013; Kellas, 2010, MOTI staff, July 
23, 2016, personal communication). This is endemic 
to the specific formation of the Metro Vancouver 
board, which is made up of politicians who are 
appointed by their local councils to the regional 
body. In turn, these representatives are more 
accountable to their own municipality, and often 
prioritize their own local interests ahead of regional 
ones (Kellas, 2010; Artibise & Meligrana, 2003).  The 
board structure and voting system may incentivize 
board directors to exchange favours by supporting 
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speak about that openly.  Their hands are 
often tied when they are doing their best 
to promote the provincial legislation, and 
then the province makes decisions that run 
completely counter.  If you look at some of 
the decisions around where investment is 
going to go from a transportation perspective, 
they are not supportive of Metro Vancouver’s 
regional growth strategy or of the intent of 
regional growth strategies in general.  (Metro 
Vancouver staff, September 22, 2016, personal 
communication). 
 
 There are various drivers of the different 
approaches to planning by Metro Vancouver and 
the BC Government.  Whereas the Cities in a Sea 
of Green vision relies on public transit, specifically 
high speed rapid transit such as the Expo Line or 
the Canada Line, to connect compact cities across 
the region, the Massey Bridge proposal aligns 
with the overall narrative in the BC government’s 
Gateway Program, which seeks to resolve congestion 
and expand road capacity through heavy road 
infrastructure.  
 
  Senft (2009) identifies two schools of 
thought in land use and transportation planning in 
Metro Vancouver. On one hand, some planners see 
congestion as a driving force and justification for 
more road capacity, which is “consistent with the 
traditional transportation planning paradigm” that 
is framed in the narrative of “utility”.  This approach 
views congestion as a supply problem that is limiting 
personal mobility and necessitates a technical 
solution, namely road expansion (Senft, 2009).  
While Senft sees this approach supported by the 
suburban municipalities dominated by auto-oriented 
landscapes, the BC government has been an even 
stronger advocate for this planning regime. 
On the other hand, regional entities such 
as Metro Vancouver, urban municipalities and the 
2016; Smith, 2009; New Public Consortia for 
Metropolitan Governance, 2011). 
5.2 The Gateway versus Cities in a Sea of 
Green
Many recent conflicts over transportation 
priorities and projects are rooted in differences in 
core planning beliefs between the regional, local and 
provincial governments. This disagreement is most 
pronounced at the political level.  Staff interview 
participants from Metro Vancouver and the BC 
government reflect positively on working towards 
a common vision and collaborative relationships 
among staff.  Provincial staff see themselves as 
working in the service of the regional Vision in a 
supportive and advisory role.  These participants are 
of the view that the Vision and its intentions are still 
central to their respective ministries’ policymaking 
(MOTI staff, July 23, 2016; CSCD staff, August 19, 
2016, personal communication).  Feedback from 
Metro Vancouver staff corroborates this view. 
However, despite synergies between provincial 
and Metro Vancouver staff, the region struggles to 
communicate its interests to the provincial decision-
makers, who appear to be fully invested in the 
Gateway vision. The following reflection of a Metro 
Vancouver staff person describes this relationship 
poignantly: 
In terms of the bureaucracies working 
together, the relationships are always good.  
Staff are professional on both ends and we 
do work in a fairly collaborative way with 
provincial staff, in particular on how best 
to implement the RGS, and on discussing 
the growth strategy legislation.  That being 
said, because the legislation and approach 
to regional growth strategies is handled 
by politicians within the province, even 
the provincial staff often find themselves 
getting frustrated - even if they might not 
are strong lobbyists for road transportation 
infrastructure. Their added benefit, from this industry 
perspective, is the instant creation of temporary 
jobs, which generates “instant gratification” for a 
large portion of industry and the public. To many 
of those interviewed, this fits well with the current 
provincial government’s preoccupation with gaining 
political support for each election cycle through 
centralized power, fast decision-making, and the 
general approval of projects that are populist, “create 
jobs” and do not challenge the provincial status quo. 
The challenge of moving beyond this polarization was 
reinforced by some political veterans:  
Part of the barrier is that the province believes 
by being involved in [discussions on the 
regional plan], they’ll become committed 
to the plan.  That won’t give them the kind 
of political flexibility to be able to react to 
see what is the next populist move.  They 
don’t want to be committed to a long term 
strategy or plan because that means they’ll 
be committed to a political choice in the 
future (Corrigan, August 24, 2016, personal 
communication). 
The success in maintaining this Vision has 
rested on the provincial politics of the 
day (Harcourt, August 9, 2016, personal 
communication).
It should be clarified that the struggle 
between the regional and provincial narratives does 
not necessarily equate to a dichotomous conflict 
between livability and economic development.  
Rather, through the key principles which underpin 
the regional Vision, plans such as the RGS aim to 
promote long-term economic development through 
many aspects of sustainability without compromising 
the region’s value for the natural environment, 
transit-oriented planning and livability, among 
others.  Most importantly, the current stalemate 
is not solely driven by differences in planning 
Mayors’ Council have resisted this reasoning. Senft 
(2009) suggests that local players are concerned with 
the limits to unrestrained growth in automobile use. 
In other words, this school of thought sees capacity 
expansion as a driver of low-density development, 
which limits the effectiveness of transit and the 
attractiveness of other transportation alternatives 
(Senft, 2009). These advocates favour transportation 
demand management solutions such as public transit 
expansion. This argument is framed by the context of 
sustainability and livability, factors which have been 
deeply rooted in Vancouver’s long standing Vision 
and embedded in the regional planning agenda.  
The presence of these two polarized core 
belief systems in transportation planning working 
with other political dynamics gives rise to heated 
debates between the provincially elected officials 
and regional players. Participants with experience 
in regional planning and community advocacy are 
skeptical on whether the benefits of GMTR will 
outweigh its costs, especially in terms of social and 
environmental losses.  They reiterate that the region 
cannot build its way out of congestion.  In contrast, 
the BC government maintains the argument that 
this is a project that will legitimately serve the public 
and alleviate supply problems, including the need 
to address traffic bottlenecks. The impetus for the 
project is perceived as facilitating and enabling 
trade, focusing on the economic benefits following 
an increase in vehicle and shipping flows, while 
downplaying possible negative outcomes in the long 
run.  
Finally, there is also a strong consensus 
among interview participants that the provincial 
government’s decisions are motivated by economic 
considerations, including trade and the priorities of 
the business community. Participants highlighted 
that stakeholders such as the construction industry 
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organizations such as the Port of Vancouver and 
Agricultural Land Commission on information 
sharing and opportunities to provide input on land 
use decisions, these arrangements are non-binding 
and “constitute overly general frameworks for 
communication” (Kellas, 2010).
Although the BC Government has generally 
practiced a non-interventionist approach to regional 
land use planning, exceptions are made for priority 
projects such as the GMTR that inadvertently impact 
regional land use and transportation planning – 
and in fact, violate regional growth management 
objectives.  In part, this may be attributed to a lack 
of coordination and consultation between the region 
and the BC government.  Using the example of 
provincial highway projects, Kellas (2010) points out 
that there are currently no legislative mechanisms 
to ensure that local governments are meaningfully 
consulted and given the opportunity to provide 
input. This is a loophole that appears to have been 
used by the provincial government in the George 
Massey Replacement Project (GMTR). 
A larger and more significant reason 
for lack of cooperation and coordination is the 
hierarchal relationship between local and provincial 
governments, as expressed by Mayor Corrigan and 
many other regional participants. They opined that 
the provincial government has chronically dismissed 
the region’s planning aspirations in favour of 
provincial status quo growth interests. 
In their view, the case of the GMTR is not 
a one-off aberration but yet another instance 
of the continued dismissal of the region by the 
province. The accumulation of unilateral decisions 
by the province further exacerbates ongoing 
intergovernmental friction and continuous lack of 
coordination of policies. Previous cases include: 
philosophies between regional, local and provincial 
governments, but also by the latter’s unwillingness to 
reconcile, consult and negotiate.  As will be discussed 
in the following sections, the BC government’s refusal 
to engage in a dialogue and the hierarchal imposition 
of authority represent one of the greatest challenges 
to preserving Cities in a Sea of Green.  
5.3 Regional Planning: A Provincial 
Inconvenience? 
[The province] sees cities and the region 
as a hindrance to what they want to do 
(Steves, September 21, 2016, personal 
communication). 
It’s nothing new for the province to change 
its mind, and millions or billions of dollars 
going to waste (Steves, September 21, 2016, 
personal communication).
You watch a government that says to you that 
if you want more money for transit you have 
to hold a referendum, but if we want to build 
more roads - spend billions of dollars on more 
roads - we are going to do that on the back of 
a napkin. You can see how a region that prides 
itself on being well planned, how frustrating 
it is to have an organization like the provincial 
government that considers planning to be an 
inconvenience (Corrigan, August 24, 2016, 
personal communication).  
Participants express strong frustration 
towards the provincial government’s lack of 
willingness to recognize and consider regional 
aspirations in decision-making.  Although Metro 
Vancouver and local municipalities are mandated 
to agree on regional planning issues, there is no 
legislative prescription to govern the working 
relationship between local and provincial 
governments. While Metro Vancouver has 
entered into collaborative agreements with senior 
TransLink are 35% from provincial sources and 
65% from local sources” (3).
6. In 2007, the BC government established the 
Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority 
Amendment Act which replaced the elected 
TransLink board with a provincially-appointed 
board and significantly reduced regional 
control over transportation planning (Kellas, 
2010).  Various expert participants credit 
this loss of regional power to the grievance 
caused when TransLink and Metro Vancouver 
resisted the Canada Line route that was 
championed by the BC government in 
preparation for the 2010 Olympics.  
7. TransLink has little influence over its own 
financing, and is required to go to the 
provincial government to enable revenue 
sources (Mayors’ Council, 2009). This is 
occurring in a context of the provincial 
government reducing taxes in a variety of 
areas and expecting local governments to 
make up lost revenues to assist in paying for 
regional transportation and transit. 
Given this record, one could argue that the BC 
government’s prioritization of the Gateway vision, 
reluctance to recognize the regional Vision, lack 
of willingness to engage with regional entities and 
continuous resorting to hierarchal means to impose 
its own power all constitute an antithesis to the 
vision that Metro Vancouver has worked to uphold.   
5.4 Lack of Meaningful Intergovernmental 
Engagement 
Simply having bodies in a room, getting 
frustrated, is not good consultation… There 
has been politicking going on, and no sign of 
a productive effort in terms of duty to consult 
(Metro Vancouver staff, September 22, 2016, 
personal communication).
1. In 1968, the government dissolved the LMRPB 
after the planning board openly criticized 
provincial decisions which were perceived to 
be at odds with regional objectives (Hodge & 
Robinson, 2001).  
2. In 1983, the re-elected Social Credit 
government disabled GVRD planning 
authority.  The regional district had opposed 
the government’s decision to exclude a 
parcel from the ALR to allow for housing 
development (which ultimately became 
the Southlands project whose approval is 
described in Section 3) (Hodge & Robinson, 
2001).  
3. Since the 1960s, the provincial government 
has subsidized automobile infrastructure and 
developments, contravening regional goals 
(Hodge & Robinson, 2001). For example, most 
recently the replacement of the Port Mann 
Bridge, the North Fraser Perimeter Road, and 
the South Fraser Perimeter Road upgrades 
made under the Gateway Program managed 
by the BC MOTI. 
4. In 1998, the BC government announced the 
construction of the Millennium SkyTrain 
extension line without consulting GVRD and 
member municipalities (Howard & Gibbon, 
1998, as cited in Hodge & Robinson, 2001, 
336).
5. Between 1997 and 2007, various legislative 
changes to the provincial tax system have 
gradually reduced provincial contributions 
to transit services.  A 2009 Mayors’ Council 
report finds that “Prior to the formation of 
TransLink, funding for transit services in the 
lower mainland was 47% from provincial 
sources and 53% from local sources. 
Currently, the revenues generated by 
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Although on a staff level, the working 
relationships between regional and provincial 
bureaucrats have been sound, this collaborative 
relationship does not extend to the political platform 
and amongst decision-makers.  Cases such as the 
Port Mann Bridge and Massey Bridge proposal 
illustrate the lack of discussion with the region 
prior to implementing projects that have significant 
regional land use implications.  The BC Government 
noted that its provincial staff have met 20 times with 
Metro Vancouver counterparts since 2012, and 20 
times each with Richmond and Delta (Bailey, March 
15, 2016), maintaining that the consultation process 
has been sufficient.  In the Project Definition Report 
(BC Government, 2015), the Ministry also states 
that it consulted widely with municipalities, First 
Nations, Metro Vancouver, TransLink, the agricultural 
community, environmental groups, first responders, 
recreational groups, local businesses, local residents, 
marine users, cyclists, other stakeholders and the 
general public. However, Richmond Councillor Harold 
Steves expressed frustration with the provincial 
consultation process on the Massey Bridge (Larsen, 
March 30, 2016): 
They have a funny idea of what consultation 
is. Their idea of consultation is they tell us 
what to do; we tell them if we like it. Then 
they go do it.
 
 Similarly, Metro Vancouver staff have 
indicated wanting more time to review Massey 
Bridge plans ahead of approval, in order to assess the 
impact of the bridge (Azpiri, 2016). Moore (Azpiri, 
February 17, 2016) admits that “ultimately, it’s [the 
province’s] road, it’s their decision, but if they want 
meaningful public input, then we think we need 
some more time to do that” (Azpiri, 2016).  
Many interview participants lament the BC 
government’s lack of willingness to engage with the 
region. Whereas collaboration and communication 
procedures between member municipalities 
and Metro Vancouver are enabled by provincial 
legislation and provided by Metro Vancouver, no 
equivalent platform or legislative mechanism exists 
to formalize engagement between local, provincial 
and even federal politicians on regional issues. 
Specifically, committee sessions and meetings for 
municipalities to provide input and debate prior to 
regional planning decision making have no federal 
or provincial counterpart to drive intergovernmental 
collaboration (Kellas, 2010). More poignantly, 
Kellas (2010) finds that the BC government has 
only recently developed staff capacity to support 
engagement activities.
Communications between governments 
therefore “tend to be on an issue by issue basis, 
which doesn’t provide a level of understanding that 
can be an effective base for policy coordination” 
(Kellas, 2010, 207). Examples include special purpose 
agencies dealing with key planning items that 
overlap interests of multiple governments, such as 
the Gateway Council (Kellas, 2010).  Occasionally, 
Metro Vancouver seeks to bring provincial attention 
to regional issues by inviting BC government 
politicians to board meetings (Kellas, 2010). For 
instance, the special provincial-regional committee 
was created during the development of the 2011 
RGS, was disbanded following adoption of the RGS 
(Yang, 2016). Under this system, the province and 
the region do not establish a structured, long-term 
relationship of collaboration, which as Kellas (2010) 
observed, results in provincial decisions that do not 
reflect a regional consensus. 
Broadway in Vancouver to the Lougheed Mall 
along the Lougheed Highway… The NDP were 
defeated in 2001 and replaced by the Gordon 
Campbell (Liberal) Government. There again 
you had the provincial government with its 
own capital priorities for transit, pursuing its 
own agenda, but trying to do so through the 
collaborative local government system that 
had been set up. That led to a great deal of 
political conflict (Cameron, August 10, 2016, 
personal communication). 
 
  While the province’s Gateway rationale 
of expansive new road and bridge infrastructure 
to accommodate growth challenges the Vision 
of a liveable region, the same may be said about 
approaches in implementing the Gateway to 
engaging the region on key decisions such as the 
Massey Bridge.  The minimal effort taken to consult 
and negotiate contrasts with the spirit of consensus-
based governance expected of the municipalities and 
Metro Vancouver under the Growth Strategies Act. 
 We control air quality in this region. We 
also control parks that are underneath [the 
new bridge].  We control land-use planning 
throughout the region. Those are really big 
discussions.  It isn’t just about replacing 
one asset right here.  It has ramifications 
throughout a whole part of this region 
(Moore, in Azpiri, February 17, 2016).
 
 Participants highlighted that the political 
philosophies, and the working relationship between 
province and region, have varied over time. There 
have been periods of cooperation and more common 
ground, with provincial government supporting the 
region’s policy pursuits and interests. However most 
recently over the last 10 years the relationship has 
been one of discord and distrust (Brunet-Jailly et al., 
2016). 
 
We had a Social Credit government that 
really didn’t understand cities, and they were 
defeated by the NDP in 1991... Mike Harcourt 
had been the Chair of the GVRD Planning 
Committee and he was very much a supporter 
of enabling communities and local planning. 
For political reasons his administration 
was distracted from those priorities in the 
[early part of the] first term. We [the region] 
were working away on Creating our Future 
and the LRSP and Transport 2021... it was 
in the second year of their term when the 
Harcourt government started to take things 
more seriously. You had a government that 
was very much aware of regional planning, 
transportation alternatives, and sustainability, 
and determined to bring back regional 
planning that had been abolished by the 
Social Credits. Then Harcourt left in 1996 and 
was replaced by the Glen Clark government. 
They didn’t like doing deals with anyone 
although they did make a deal with the region 
to set up TransLink. They were very a one-
off government, politically driven, and the 
political priority for them was building the 
Broadway-Lougheed rapid transit line leading 
through the heart of NDP territory from 
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6. SENSIBLE  
POLICY OPTIONS
The analysis presented here points to a fairly 
stark and systemic divide between the Provincial 
vision of the region as a Gateway, and the regional 
vision of Cities in a Sea of Green. More pragmatically, 
however, this section lays out some structural and 
institutional improvements that may help promote 
the type of region the Vision foresees. These are as 
follows:
1. Joined-up governance
A lack of coordination vertically between 
different levels of government, and horizontally 
among local governments prevents regions from 
reaching the full extent of their visions (Walisser, 
2013).  The region may benefit from ‘joined-up 
governance’.  Without intergovernmental and cross-
sector involvement, regions are severely limited in 
their ability to develop and implement viable plans. 
As an example, Quebec brings provincial, regional 
and local elected officials together to achieve joined 
up decision-making in regions.  Such meetings also 
include delegates from economic, culture, education 
and science sectors.  
2. Incentivising regional decision making
With the current structure of regional 
governance, local representatives on the board 
who are tasked with making regional decisions can 
find the process of prioritizing regional aspirations 
over local ones to be politically unrewarding, and 
potentially punishing.  The region may benefit from 
examining types of mechanisms that incentivise 
regional thinking over local protectionism.  One 
example is challenge grants that are issued on a 
competitive basis to local governments who are able 
to collaborate and demonstrate that they possess 
common vision and objectives. 
3. Dispute resolution
Central governments often resort to “hard-
power” solutions, such as imposing spending 
mandates or forcing reform of structures and 
allocation of functions, often with disappointing 
results.  BC uses alternative dispute resolution to 
resolve differences in developing, implementing 
and updating regional growth strategies and in 
operating regional services. Both provincial and local 
levels of government should attempt to build these 
alternative dispute resolution processes surrounding 
divergent solutions for conflicts at both the provincial 
and regional arenas. 
4. Enhance meaningful public engagement 
efforts at the regional level
Even though the overall Vision for Metro 
Vancouver has remained centred around key values 
of sustainability and complete communities, the 
public profile about that Vision has likely changed 
significantly since the inception of “Cities in a Sea of 
Green.” As the region grows, better means of gauging 
and engaging public values are needed. The regional 
transportation plebiscite as an engagement tool, for 
example, failed to reveal the reason why 62% of the 
region voted against the sales tax increase to finance 
improved transit service (McDougall, 2015). 
Enhancing public engagement efforts at 
the regional level has been Metro Vancouver’s key 
priority in helping the broader public understand and 
value the region’s planning aspirations: 
 
We have to be quite creative in thinking of 
ways that we will get out there and have 
a broad public conversation and build the 
profile and understanding… It’s partly 
education, it’s partly collaboration. It’s 
partly dialogue and engagement... It’s about 
building relationships with the many other 
organizations that are champions, and 
are promoting the same kind of value set, 
and finding ways to all be at the table in a 
mutually supportive way… We don’t want to 
have to preach to people that agricultural 
land is valuable, we want people to know that 
be burdened by conflicts that arise from different 
organizational and political objectives. With an 
increase in transportation-related funds now flowing 
from the federal government (a commitment 
to provide 50 per cent of the funds for transit 
infrastructure projects), it might be possible to 
replace the traditional one-third funding model, that 
requires each level of government to contribute one-
third of the funding to capital projects. The Mayors’ 
Council suggested a new funding model whereby 
“municipalities would provide 10 per cent of funds 
and the provincial government would provide one 
third of the remaining investment while also using 
its legislative authority to create new revenue 
sources to close the remaining seven per cent gap” 
(David Suzuki Foundation, 2016). Regardless of the 
model, the Province needs to act as the region’s 
ally by showing collaborative support for future 
transportation funding proposals.   
 
  New sources of revenue should be diversified 
to reduce the dependency of the agency on 
instruments that are sensitive to economic cycles 
(Mayors’ Council, 2009). Possible options include 
transferring a portion of the provincial carbon tax to 
fund public transit, which is currently revenue neutral 
and used as a climate action credit for individuals and 
businesses (Mayors’ Council, 2009).  Some additional 
funding options include a tax on containers moving 
by truck through or within Metro Vancouver, a 
vehicle levy, a vehicle sales tax, road pricing, a land 
value capture tax, a hotel tax, a regional sales tax, or 
an employer payroll tax.  
 
  Finally, as TransLink embarks upon a fare 
review process to consider new options such as 
distance based transit fares, TransLink should also 
develop strategies to couple and mirror transit 
fares and road pricing schemes. Coupling these 
two strategies and ensuring both mechanisms 
are implemented could help reduce sprawl, while 
providing new options to finance the transportation 
network.  
 
and believe that themselves.  That requires 
communication, education and celebration. 
In so far as the public does not have all of 
that knowledge and memory, the same thing 
happens with municipal politicians.   (Metro 
Vancouver Staff, September 22, 2016, personal 
communication).  
 
 The impact of enhanced public engagement 
efforts could be both increased awareness within 
the general public, and increased engagement of 
the public in political processes. It is through public 
engagement efforts that the broader public can 
become more equipped to move elected officials 
forward on pressing public policies.  
5. Legislative Changes
Various participants have raised the issue of 
a lack of accountability within the decision-making 
structure of Metro Vancouver.  In response, some 
put forth the possibility of a double-direct election 
system in which board directors are directly elected 
by the public.  In this regard, decision-makers may 
be more motivated to promote the regional interest, 
rather than those of their home municipalities. 
Another alternative is to pursue legislative 
amendments that would empower regions to enforce 
their policies. Allowing greater local and regional 
determination is not necessarily a detriment to 
province-wide or nation-wide interests. 
Metro Vancouver… [needs] to have stronger 
muscle as far as land use, transportation and 
financing goes. There’s a discontinuity. One of 
the struggles is because there isn’t one strong 
body in the region to speak for transportation 
(Metro Vancouver Staff, September 22, 2016, 
personal communication).
6. Transportation Funding
TransLink must be properly funded or the 
future of the Region is in peril (Mayor’s 
Council, 2009., 1). 
With TransLink’s current governance model, 
and without increased collaboration and co-
governance, transportation funding will continue to 
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CONCLUSION
The principles surrounding “Cities in a Sea of Green” have guided the region for decades.  The aim of 
this Vision for livability and sustainability has survived the test of time and has remained in focus in growth 
strategies, transportation plans and to a great extent, local land use decisions. But the region is at a crossroads. 
Metro Vancouver is losing its momentum to maintain the Vision, as stakeholders struggle to align core 
principles with market and political priorities.  This report has attempted to provide an overview of where the 
region sits in the context of urban and transportation planning by considering the success and evolution of the 
Vision, its progress and looming challenges. 
This report analyzed two overarching storylines to regional governance – a struggle between municipal 
and regional governance entities of Metro Vancouver, and a struggle of regional interests, including Metro 
Vancouver, TransLink and municipalities, and the Province.  It first examined the collaborative structure of 
municipal-regional governance.  Specifically, it questioned whether the reliance on a regional collaborative 
approach, moral persuasion and local autonomy is conducive to guiding 23 local authorities in implementing 
the ambitious RGS when each jurisdiction holds unique political priorities and land use interests. Second, using 
the case study of the Massey Bridge proposal, the paper offered a critique of intergovernmental relationships 
surrounding land use and transportation decisions.  It argued that while the intergovernmental disagreement is 
rooted in provincial and regional differences in core planning beliefs and political priorities, the BC government 
has been reluctant to recognize, let alone support, the regional Vision.  There has also been a persistence on 
the part of the provincial government to resort to executive power when challenged by regional stakeholders.  
This practice, combined with the implementation of the Gateway program, form the antithesis to that Cities in 
a Sea of Green principle the region has sought to uphold. 
The overall aim of this report is to help inform pressing regional matters relating to urban development, 
transportation, and most importantly, how governments and stakeholders work together.  This paper 
concludes with some potential policy options as food for thought.  It is hoped that this report will increase 
awareness and thoughtful debate amongst the public, policy leaders and professionals.  
so common in other regions, in which every farm 
is seen by the landowner and others as a future 
subdivision. 
“Cities in a Sea of Green” enabled us to see 
the interconnectedness of the environment, the 
economy and community well-being and to see our 
regional land base as a scarce resource that must 
be used efficiently for the protection of natural and 
economic assets as well as for the construction of 
cities and towns. 
While the record is not perfect, it is 
remarkable that this vision has prevailed to the extent 
that it has, in the face of dramatic population and 
economic growth and the slings and arrows that 
characterize politics in British Columbia.
“Cities in a Sea of Uncertainty” rightly give 
significant attention to the role of the provincial 
government in the failures as much as the successes 
in the achievement of the vision. In general, 
provincial governments in Canada don’t do spatial 
planning very much and rarely do they do it well. 
Doing it well involves three steps:  thinking about the 
future in a comprehensive way, evaluating possible 
alternatives and selecting strategies and actions 
for a desirable future, with full public engagement 
at each step of the way. Dominated by the over-
representation of rural areas in the legislature 
and hamstrung by a siloed approach to policy and 
administration, the provincial government in British 
Columbia has demonstrated that it really doesn’t 
understand modern urban regions, even though three 
of the 10 premiers since 1950 have been former 
mayors of cities in the Vancouver region. 
Since World War II, the provincial government 
has followed two modalities, often at the same 
time: facilitation of local government planning 
and cooperation on the one hand, and direct 
AFTERWORD: ARE WE 
NEARLY THERE YET?
Ken Cameron and Christina DeMarco
We must first commend Gordon Price for 
literally putting his money where his mouth is in 
sponsoring this student prize on the fate of the 
“Cities in a Sea of Green” vision. After many years 
of work as a politician, writer and educator on key 
regional planning issues in what is now known as 
Metro Vancouver, Gordon developed a serious sense 
of concern that we as a region have “lost the plot” 
of a visionary concept that had guided the region 
for six decades.  Having devoted decades of our own 
professional lives to the fulfillment of that concept, 
we jumped at the opportunity to comment on “Cities 
in a Sea of Uncertainty”  as an assessment of the fate 
of, and prospects for, that concept. 
It is important to recognize at the outset 
that the Lower Mainland as a region is significantly 
different from what it could have been without the 
vision and policies it inspired. It is also increasingly 
different from nearly every other metropolitan area 
in North America. While it is one urban region, it 
contains a number of “cities” – relatively compact, 
complete communities served (or planned to 
be served) by a transportation system that gives 
priority to transit, walking and cycling rather than 
the private automobile. These include the central 
“city” – downtown Vancouver, which has achieved 
international recognition as a place to live, study and 
play in comparison with the “executive downtowns” 
commonly found elsewhere in North America.  Also 
notable is the “sea of green,” a working landscape 
that includes productive farmland, forest, watersheds 
and other green areas connected by non-urbanized 
corridors for the use of pedestrians, cyclists and 
wildlife.  The creation of the provincial Agricultural 
Land Reserve and the Green Zone broke the pattern, 
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surprising when one considers that the leadership 
of the governing BC Liberal party is increasingly 
influenced not by urban constituencies but by 
suburban populations who, as in the Greater Toronto 
Area’s 905 region, see the role of the provincial 
government as ensuring that road transportation is 
available between bedrooms and jobs.
As destructive to “Cities in a Sea of Green” as 
the province’s highway investments have been over 
the years, they alone are not enough to give rise 
to the anxiety reflected in the students’ essay.  The 
ability of local government in Metro Vancouver to 
provide strong direction as a municipal federation 
has also taken a hit. Admittedly, Metro Vancouver 
condemned the Massey bridge project; Chair Greg 
Moore stated “This project represents an expansion 
of car-oriented infrastructure and diverts crucial 
funds from transportation projects that support 
the regional growth strategy.” But the massive 
retail complex on Tsawwassen First Nation lands, 
far removed from the regional transit network, and 
having one of the largest surface parking areas in the 
province, prompted barely a squeak out of Metro 
Vancouver and TransLink when it was proposed. 
Given that the development was on landed ceded 
to the First Nation as part of a treaty settlement (a 
provincial priority enjoying strong public support) 
it is unlikely that Metro could have exerted much 
influence on the shopping centre.  The proposal 
could, however, have offered an opportunity for a 
public debate that would have helped to highlight 
the relationship between this development and the 
region’s established land use and transportation 
objectives. 
Metro did have the ability to say ‘no’ to the 
Century Holdings development of more than 900 
homes  in Southlands located outside of region’s 
urban containment boundary, but in the end it was 
intervention in the name of supposed province-wide 
economic imperatives on the other. In the category 
of facilitation of local planning and cooperation 
would be the support provided by the province 
for the creation of the Lower Mainland Regional 
Planning Board, the regional district system and the 
Growth Strategies Act. All of these initiatives had 
in common the philosophy that local government 
should be empowered to plan and act cooperatively 
and that the province has no substantive interest 
in planning policies. In the second category, direct 
intervention, would be provincial decisions on 
highway development (Gateway program; Massey 
Tunnel replacement), transit (selection of SkyTrain 
technology and the Canada Line) and agricultural 
land protection (the Agricultural Land Reserve). 
The most egregious intervention by the province - 
forcing a plebiscite on transportation funding on the 
region in 2015 - stands in a class by itself.  The best 
summary of the thinking involved in many of these 
direct intervention decisions is contained in Premier 
Christy Clark’s comments upon announcing her 
government’s intention to replace the Massey Tunnel 
in September 2013:
“If you are a commuter coming to work from 
Tsawwassen, it’s a headache, but for our economy 
though it’s a real bottleneck and it makes it tough for 
goods from all across the country to be able to move 
through our ports. We need to fix that.”
These words tell us that economic imperatives 
are the priority, with social, economic and regional 
planning factors taking a back seat.  Provincial policy 
seems to give priority to economic throughput as the 
Lower Mainland’s primary function and to encourage 
people to settle where they please and commute 
by automobile to work someplace else, ignoring 
the implications for greenhouse gas reduction, 
agricultural land protection, healthy commutes 
and complete communities. This is, perhaps, not 
municipalities have a set of shared interests and the 
growth strategy is the set of rules that they agree 
to collectively in order to protect these interests. 
There are countless ways in which the Regional 
Growth Strategy can be undermined by actions taken 
wholly within a municipality, so this ruling is a major 
setback for the effectiveness of regional planning. 
This example raises questions about the continued 
viability of the underlying philosophy of the Regional 
Growth Strategy legislation, which is that planning 
is a collaborative, non-hierarchical process in 
which disputes, when they arise, are resolved by 
negotiation or (as a last resort) arbitration rather 
than through the courts.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of these 
examples of the failure of the current arrangements 
to advance the principles of “Cities in a Sea of Green” 
is the apparent absence of concern on the part of 
many of the key players about the implications of 
these distressing outcomes. If for some reason we 
have lost the willingness and energy to make the 
current arrangements continue working toward our 
vision, we need to find another way to pursue it or 
select an alternative view of the future that is more 
in keeping with today’s apparent priorities.
TransLink is another key player. Again using 
the Massey Tunnel example, TransLink has been 
mysteriously silent in the whole Massey Tunnel 
replacement debate. The tunnel is a provincial 
facility but TransLink is responsible for regional 
transportation planning, so why would it not have 
a view on this key component of the regional 
transportation network? The South Coast British 
Columbia Transportation Authority Act states among 
TransLink’s responsibilities: 
approved by a resounding majority. The resolution 
– one way or the other – of a 35-year old regional 
planning dispute over the former Spetifore farm may 
have been the dominant factor in the minds of many 
on the Metro board.  
Obviously both of these developments in 
Delta add significantly to the demand for vehicle 
movement in the Massey Tunnel corridor. They 
illustrate how individual decisions, many of which 
may have compelling logic, have added up to a 
significant departure from the “Cities in a Sea of 
Green” vision. 
The essay mentions a very important recent 
episode in the history of regional planning in Metro 
Vancouver. Metro Vancouver felt compelled to 
take legal action against the Township of Langley to 
challenge the Township’s right to develop in an area 
designated for agriculture. This was a difficult and 
courageous move for a governance system operating 
on a federation model; in fact the initiation of legal 
action by Metro against one of its members seemed 
to many to be a sign that the whole system of 
cooperative planning between municipalities and the 
region had broken down. Nevertheless, a key point 
of principle was considered to be at stake when the 
municipality wanted to depart from the new Regional 
Growth Strategy so soon after it had been enacted. In 
an illustration of the dangers involved in attempting 
to resolve planning disputes through legal action, 
Metro lost the court case and did not pursue further 
legal action on this issue. 
The implications are devastating for regional 
planning. The court ruled that Metro Vancouver’s 
Regional Growth Strategy “does not have superiority 
over land use management within the boundaries of 
a municipality”. Intentionally or otherwise, this ruling 
goes against the central principle of the regional 
growth strategy legislation, which is that member 
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The region needs an engaged citizenry, an 
engaged business sector, and engaged students and 
academics to help keep the regional vision alive 
and relevant. Gordon Price’s sponsorship of this 
project is an example of the actions that will amplify 
the voice for a regional planning approach. We are 
heartened to see that there is a growing movement 
among academics to use their scholarship to bridge 
the research/practice gap and to offer new ways of 
thinking. They are helping all of us to ask the right 
questions. This approach will not only yield dividends 
in informed decision-making but will help students 
to learn about the role they can play in shaping their 
own future. 
Ken Cameron is an Adjunct Professor of Urban 
Studies at Simon Fraser University and of Community 
and Regional Planning at the University of British 
Columbia. He has held senior positions in planning 
and urban governance in the Toronto and Vancouver 
regions, most recently as Manager of Policy and 
Planning for the Greater Vancouver Regional District 
(now Metro Vancouver), where he played a key role in 
the adoption of the Livable Region Strategic Plan and 
the creation of the Greater Vancouver Transportation 
Authority (TransLink). Between 2004 and 2009, Ken 
was CEO of the provincial Homeowner Protection 
Office. He is now a consultant who has been involved 
in a number of projects related to regional planning, 
transportation planning and urban governance.  With 
Mike Harcourt and the late Sean Rossiter, Ken is the 
author of City Making in Paradise: Nine Decisions that 
Saved Vancouver, Douglas & McIntyre, 2007.
4 (1) Subject to this Act, the authority must 
do the following to carry out its purpose:
…4(f) review, and advise the Greater 
Vancouver Regional District, the municipalities and 
the government regarding the implications to the 
regional transportation system of,
…(iii) major development proposals and 
provincial highway infrastructure plans in the 
transportation service region.
The Act states must, not should, but the 
only mention of the Massey Tunnel  replacement 
in TransLink’s official documents is the following 
contained in the Regional Transportation Strategy 
(2013) “The Province has identified the Massey 
Tunnel as a priority, and substantial investments will 
be required to complete local networks in developing 
areas to improve road safety”.
The formulation of the Regional 
Transportation Strategy should have been the time 
to send a clear message to the province on what sort 
of facility would support a transit-oriented region. 
It should have been discussed and debated with 
provincial staff and the public. 
The students’ analysis of the fate of “Cities 
in a Sea of Green” illustrates the complexity 
of metropolitan governance. The examples of 
departures from the vision may raise the question 
of whether the regional approach is worth pursuing 
at all. One needs only to consider the ways in which 
“Cities in a Sea of Green” produced a region that 
is different from others in North America and from 
what it would otherwise have been, to conclude 
that the region is the right scale to provide enduring 
solutions to metropolitan issues. But it takes energy 
and leadership as well as vision to pursue a long 
term, sustainable view and to put the short term 
thinking in a proper context.   
Christina DeMarco is a former Division 
Manager of Regional Development at Metro 
Vancouver and was the lead planner responsible for 
the current Regional Growth Strategy titled Metro 
Vancouver 2040: Shaping Our Future, enacted by the 
Metro Vancouver Board in 2011. Prior to working 
for Metro Vancouver, she was a long range strategic 
planner at the City of Vancouver where she was on 
the Transportation Plan team, CityPlan team and 
author of the Industrial Lands Strategy.  She spent 10 
years working in metropolitan planning for Sydney, 
Canberra and Perth in Australia. She is currently a 
consultant and also does pro bono work for non-profit 
groups. Her latest publication is a chapter co-authored 
with John Abbott titled “Regional Strategic Planning 
and managing uncertainty in Greater Vancouver” 
appearing in Situated Practices of Strategic Planning: 
An International Perspective, Routledge, 2017.
APPENDIX A:  
INTERVIEW 
PARTICIPANTS
•	 Ken Cameron, former Manager, Policy and 
Planning, Metro Vancouver, August 10, 2016. 
•	 Derek Corrigan, Mayor, City of Burnaby, August 
24, 2016. 
•	 Michael Harcourt, former Premier of BC and 
former Mayor of Vancouver, August 9, 2016.
•	 Jeff Leigh, Chair, HUB Cycling Vancouver, August 
1, 2016.
•	 Harold Steves, Councillor, City of Richmond, 
September 21, 2016. 
•	 Undisclosed Participant, BC Ministry of 
Transportation and Infrastructure (MOTI), July 23, 
2016. 
•	 Undisclosed Participant, BC Ministry of 
Community, Sports and Cultural Development 
(CSCD), August 24, 2016. 
•	 Undisclosed Participant, Metro Vancouver, 
September 22, 2016. 
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APPENDIX B: SUMMARY 
OF RECENT RESEARCH 
ON THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF INADEQUATE 
SUPPORT FOR COMPACT 
AND TRANSIT-FRIENDLY 
PLANNING
1. Sprawl
The urban ideal of walkable neighbourhoods 
containing socially mixed, high density housing in 
close proximity to transit and daily amenities is 
undermined by urban sprawl, which is characterised 
by low density housing and poor accessibility to 
services (Garfinkel-Castro et al., 2016). Urban 
compactness is denoted by density of development, 
mix of development types (homes, shops, 
workplaces), centredness (activity centres and town 
centres), and street connectivity (Garfinkel-Castro 
et al., 2016). Examining developments in the Metro 
Vancouver region, urban compactness exists, but not 
uniformly or region-wide.
2. Loss of green spaces
 Green space is typically open, undeveloped 
land with vegetation, and includes parks, forests, and 
playing fields (McMorris et al., 2015). Research finds 
that urban green spaces have important benefits to 
human health. McMorris et al. (2015) examined data 
from a national survey of Canadians and found that 
urban residents who live in the highest quartile of 
greenness were more likely to participate in outdoor 
leisure-time physical activity compared to those in 
the lowest quartile. This positive relationship was 
evidenced among all income groups and especially 
among younger adults and young women (McMorris 
et al., 2015). Green spaces and outdoor leisure 
foster social connections between neighbours and 
communities, with related positive effects on mental 
wellbeing (Kaczynski et al., 2009). Other researchers 
have found that proximity to green space improves 
people’s sleep quality, in particular by lowering the 
incidence of short sleep duration of less than 6 hours 
per night (Astell-Burt et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
living close to green spaces has been found to 
lower stroke mortality rates and respiratory related 
mortality, and is associated with a lower mortality 
rate for other causes as well (Villeneuve et al., 2012). 
3. Health
Ewing, Hamidi and Grace (2016) found that 
urban sprawl is a risk factor in motor vehicle crashes. 
The authors found that sprawl is associated with 
significantly higher direct and indirect effects on 
fatal crash rates due to higher traffic speeds and 
greater vehicle miles driven in sprawling areas (Ewing 
et al., 2016). Garfinkel-Castro et al. (2016) discuss 
the association between low walkability, sprawling 
urban environments and obesity (BMI > 30). Some 
environments are more obseogenic than others, and 
adults in sprawling built environments are statistically 
more likely to be obese. In particular, Griffin et al 
(2013) used longitudinal data on American post-
menopausal women and found that women in 
more compact communities have a baseline lower 
probability of experiencing coronary heart disease 
(CHD) and death. The authors found that high 
residential density has a particularly high impact on 
lowering incidence of CHD (Griffin et al., 2013). 
4. Environment
 Increased vehicle emissions and pollutant 
runoff, which is a direct result of urban sprawl, 
contributes to air, earth, and water pollution (Brauer 
et al., 2013; Thompson, 2013). Owrangi, Lannigan 
and Simonovic (2014) have argued that unsound 
land use changes and certain types of residential 
development patterns have led to a significant 
decrease in vegetation cover between 1984 and 
2012, potentially eliminating natural habitats and 
river flows. Developing farmland has been shown to 
damage wildlife habitats, including species of special 
concern such as the Short-Eared Owl in BC (COSEWIC, 
2008). Wintering habitats, especially the Fraser River 
Delta, are being altered through urbanization and 
agricultural practices. Developers are converting 
coastal marshes and uncultivated fields into housing, 
industry, or intensive agriculture (COSEWIC, 2008). 
Causing damage to migratory animals in one region 
of the province has impacts on the population as 
a whole, and knock-on effects for other levels in 
the ecosystem. Furthermore, urban sprawl can 
have significant effects on ecological connectivity 
and function (Dupras et al., 2016). Ecosystems are 
intrinsically of value, and also important for human 
well-being. Erosion or elimination of ecosystem 
services such as water filtration, storage and runoff, 
clean air, pollination, and erosion control, as well as 
damage to recreation and enjoyment are some of the 
consequences (Thompson, 2013). 
5. Economic consequences
 The demand for sprawl is induced by 
inadequate accounting for the fiscal costs of this 
development pattern, which are borne by the whole 
of society. For example, decades of government 
spending on road and highway infrastructure for 
personal vehicle commuting enables, subsidizes, 
and perpetuates sprawl by externalizing the cost 
of personal transportation. This goes hand in 
hand with hidden costs of road use and sprawl 
including illness, injuries and climate change. 
Taxpayers absorb many of the costs of development 
directly in the development process, and in the 
long term as infrastructure liability. For example, 
new developments require new capital spending, 
maintenance costs, and replacement costs. 
Thompson (2013) also notes that governments in 
Canada spend nearly $29 billion on roads annually, 
which all Canadians pay through taxes, although 
households outside of the city-centre generally drive 
three times as much as their urban counterparts.
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APPENDIX C:  
BIOGRAPHIES
Katelyn McDougall
Katelyn McDougall is a Master of Urban Studies 
student at Simon Fraser University (SFU) and holds 
a Bachelor of Arts in Sociology and Geography 
from Vancouver Island University (VIU). Her 
Master’s research focuses on public policy decision 
making, specifically using TransLink’s vehicle levy 
proposal (2000) as a case study on the complexity 
of transportation finance decision making in an 
intergovernmental setting. She is constantly curious 
about systems change, as well as innovation in policy, 
governance and politics - and how these things 
together can help create socially, environmentally, 
culturally and economically balanced cities and 
spaces.
Katelyn is also Principal and Managing Director at 
OfCity Consulting. In this role she has worked on a 
long list of policy research and public engagement 
projects for a variety of clients including the City 
of Nanaimo, PIBC, the City of Parksville, Island 
Timberlands, Buy Social Canada, the Burnaby 
Heights Merchants’ Association, the Office of the 
Mayor for the City of Vancouver, and Convergence 
Communications. 
Linda Mussell
Linda Mussell is a PhD Student in the Department 
of Political Studies at Queen’s University with field 
specialisations in Canadian Politics and Gender 
Politics. Her Master’s degree is in Public Policy 
(2016) from Simon Fraser University (SFU) where 
she focused on social policy and justice system 
involvement. For her Master’s thesis she examined 
the heterogeneous experiences of youth with 
incarcerated parents in British Columbia and policy 
options to offer improved support for this vulnerable 
population. During that time she also conducted 
policy research with Legal Aid BC on strategies to 
assist self-represented litigants. Research projects 
Linda has recently worked include primary research 
on gender and diversity mainstreaming policy in 
Canada (for Dr. Olena Hankivsky, SFU); gender 
pay equity in universities (SFU Equity Advisory 
Committee); global care chains, gender, migration, 
and health (WHO Gender Equity Rights Unit); 
and a comprehensive literature review on gender 
policy machineries (government contract). Her 
research interests centre on policy issues in British 
Columbia, GBA+ and gender mainstreaming, refugee/
immigration policy, and justice system involvement.
Sherry Yang
Sherry Yang recently graduated with a Master of 
Public Policy from Simon Fraser University (SFU) 
and holds a Bachelor of Arts in Geography from the 
University of British Columbia (UBC).  Her research 
focuses on the policy and intergovernmental 
processes of regional economic development and 
urban environmental sustainability.  
 
Sherry has worked as an analyst with numerous 
public sector agencies in policy areas including 
economic development, innovation and First Nations 
treaties.  She is currently working with the City of 
Vancouver on various policy and program initiatives.  
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